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Mr. BURCHETT's
JUSTIFICATION
OF HIS
Naval-Memoirs.
IN
ANSWER
TO
REFLECTIONS
MADE BY
Col. LILLINGSTON,
On that Part which relates to
Cape François and Port de Paix.
WITH
Some short *Observations* on our
West-India Expeditions.

In the S A V O R:
Printed by *Edward Jones*. MDCCIV.

MR. BURCHETT'S

JUSTIFICATION

OF HIS
To his Royal Highness Prince
GEORGE OF DEN
mark, &c. Lord High
Admiral of England and
Ireland, and of all Her
Majesty's Plantations, and
Generalissimus of all Her
Majesty's Forces &c.

I
T is, Royal Highness, no less
natural for
Your Majesty's Justification
Reputation, but to Petition a
Prince to pardonize what is not
Just is an unpardonable Crime.
A 3



*To his Royal Highness Prince
GEORGE of Den-
mark, &c. Lord High
Admiral of England and
Ireland, and of all Her
Majesty's Plantations, and
Generalissimo of all Her
Majesty's Forces, &c.*

IT is, ROYAL SIR, no less
reasonable than natural for
a Man to vindicate his
Reputation; but to Petition a
Prince to Patronize what is not
Just, is an unpardonable Crime.

The Epistle Dedicatory.

If I declined the first, I should injure my self: And I shall always endeavour not to be Criminal in the latter.

That small Treatise, which I now humbly present to Your ROYAL HIGHNESS, is to justify my *Memoirs of Naval Affairs the last War*. Your HIGHNESS was pleased to Grace me by Your Acceptance of *that* Book; and I am an humble Petitioner, that *this* may also have Your Princely Countenance.

It contains a more particular Account of the Expedition to *Cape François* and *Port de Paix*, than I did formerly give; and the

The Epistle Dedicatory.

the whole is Collected from
Original Papers of those who
Commanded at Sea in that Ser-
vice. —

I shall always take the greatest
Care not to impose on others
what is false; but to be guilty
of such a Crime towards Your
ROYAL HIGHNESS, might
justly deprive me of the Favour
of so Great and Good a Master,
which is what I will endeavour
to preserve, by a constant and
faithful Discharge of my Duty
in Your Service.

That Heaven may bestow its
greatest Blessing on Her Majesty,
my Gracious Sovereign, and on

The Epistle Dedicatory.

Your Royal Person ; and that
you may both live long to enjoy
them here, is, and shall be, the
sincere Prayer of,

(*May it please Your*
ROYAL HIGHNESS)

Your Royal Highness's
most Dutiful, and most
Obedient humble Servant,

Admiralty-Office,
Febr. 18. 1703.

Josiah Burchett.

THE
PREFACE
TO THE
READER.

THAT Man who Collects, and Publishes things past, for the Information of others, has but little Encouragement for his Pains, when any one who relishes not a Minute past, assumes the liberty of reflecting on the whole: And yet it would be severe indeed, if an Impartial History, grounded upon Personal Inspection and Observations, as well as the most Authentick Vouchers, should be disesteemed upon the Score of what another may be induced to say by way of Contradiction.

I did not write my Memoirs of Naval-Transactions the last War, either at the
Instigation,

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Instigation, or for the Sake of any particular Persons; but believing it might be Satisfactory, I undertook the Trouble for that only Reason, and employ'd no other Hands or Eyes than my own, even though my Time was otherwise so fully taken up, as that I might reasonably have been excused from such a Work.

As to Self-advantage, it was far from my thoughts; for I then found, as now I do, too many Rubs in the way, notwithstanding my more than Twenty Years painful Service in the Navy; nor had I any manner of Inclination to be Partial, either on one side or t'other. The whole was finished, and the Printer had done his Part, ere the Contents of my Book were made known, even to those who were principally concern'd. And I do aver, That I took equal care not to over-value the Services of my best Friends, or to lessen, or misrepresent, the Actions of those who were greatest Strangers to me.

What other Reason then could Colonel Lullingston have for his General Reflections, than that my Account of his West-India Expedition does not suit his Inclinations? I was not only Four Years of the War Secretary to the Admiral of the Fleet; but

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but the remainder of the time (both before and after) constantly in this Office, where are, I am sure, the most Authentick Records of Maritime Affairs: Wherefore I hope that all unprejudiced Men will incline to believe, that what I have taken so much Care and Pains to Publish, may justly deserve Credit.

As I have endeavoured to make it appear by the following Sheets, That I wanted not Authorities for what I formerly writ, concerning the Expedition to Cape Francois and Port de Paix; so have I quoted several Original Papers to justify what is now added thereunto; and I believe it will appear, that I have in no wise been influenced by Passion or Prejudice, although I wanted not sufficient Provocation.

Less than I have done, I could not do, without being guilty of an Injury to my own Reputation, which I will never endeavour to justify by other Methods, than what are sincere and honourable. And as I have avoided those harsh Expressions, which are too often met with in Colonel Lillingston's Book; so it is possible, That had he himself writ it, and not made use of another's Pen, it would have appear'd in a more decent Dress: For certainly, a Gentleman
cannot

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cannot entertain thoughts of Railing, when he employs his Pen on a Subject that requires Solidity and good Manners.

Had I been present in the Expedition, we are now speaking of; and had I certainly known several things contain'd in Colonel Lillingston's Book, concerning the Sea-Officers, not candidly related; yet would it not, for that reason, be justifiable in me, to Censure other Matters entirely remote from my Knowledge or Understanding: Whereas he would have most of my Memoirs to be either Partial, or taken on Trust, because (as I have already observed) a small part which relates to himself does not please him.

Were his Assertions fact, I should, long e're this, have been told by those who acted in a much higher Sphere, that I had not done them Justice; but I have not yet encountered any such Mortification. If Colonel Lillingston knows (as he seems to hint he does) any Gentleman, who thinks he has reason to be offended at any part of my Book, I shall, with the like freedom I now use, endeavour to satisfy him on what I grounded my Belief; but if there happens to be none but himself, (as I hope, and believe there is not) then has he unwarily
affixed

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affixed his Name to what he had not well considered.

From my own Knowledge, I do not pretend to contradict what he has said of his own Meritorious Services; and therefore I do refer to what is contain'd in the following Pages, to justify as well the Gentlemen of the Sea, as what I did formerly, and have now writ on this Subject; by which you will find what the Living have said, and what hath been declared by those who are Dead; and if by them I have been misguided, Theirs is the Fault, Mine the Misfortune: But the greatest part, if not the whole, is so strongly confirm'd by the Journals of others who were in the Squadron; that unless there had been a general Combination, both before, at, and after the Action, they could not agree so unanimously as they do; and I dare answer for it, it was as far from being thought of, as 'twas possible to bring such a thing to pass.

I was but little acquainted with Captain Wilmot, as to his Person, and less with his Morals; nor are those other Gentlemen, who were in the Expedition, and yet alive, much better known to me; wherefore I cannot be so good an Advocate for him, or them, in that particular, as otherwise might be

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be expected. It is their part to free themselves from Colonel Lillingston's Reflections in that Point, as I have esteemed it mine, to let the World see what I have from them to justify their Actions in the Publick Service, and the Accounts which I have given of them.

Indeed I thought it but reasonable to say what I have done, in behalf of Gentlemen, on whose Reputation so heavy a Load is laid; for otherwise I should have acquiesced in what he asserts, That I had not Authorities for what I formerly writ: And as I always had, and shall have a very great Esteem for those who are so often exposed to great and various Hazards in the Service of their Country; so would it be very hard if the Grave, which confines the Bodies of our Fellow-Creatures, should have yet the further Power of Burying with them our Inclinations to do Justice to their Fame, the only valuable thing they can leave behind. And surely that Man is far from deserving Blame, who performs so generous and charitable an Office, provided he does not launch out beyond the Bounds of Truth.

If Colonel Lillingston's Account meets with the good fortune to weigh down the Scale,

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Scale, so be it ; for I owe him not so much
Prejudice, as to desire he may be denied
Justice. My chief Business is, by this Book,
to convince the World and him, That I
had not the Spirit of Divination when I
writ my former : And I do entirely sub-
mit the whole to your Impartial Judgment,
in hopes that it will not fare the worse for
its unpolished Dress, since my want of Abi-
lities, and convenient Leisure, has been the
real occasion of it.

Mr.

The Preface to the Reader.

Sober & serious, for I am not to write
Familiar, as to style he may be drawn
Justice, this chief Business is by this Book
to convince the World and him, That I
had not the Spirit of Division when I
first was formed; And I do entirely re-
vise the whole of my former Disputations
in hope that it will not lose the more for
its unpolished Dress. Your servant of Abi-
lith, and constant Labourer has been the
real author of it.

WILLIAM

REMARKS

ON THE

DISPUTATIONS

OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF

OXFORD

IN THE

YEAR 1711

BY

JOHN

WILKINS

ESQ.

Mr. BURCHET's
ANSWER
TO
Col. LILLINGSTON's
REMARKS
ON THE
Expedition to Cape François
and Port de Paix.

COULD I have borrowed more time from Publick Business, my Reply to Colonel Lillingston's Book should not have been so long from the Press: And although I did at first design it much shorter than it is, yet when I consider'd the almost unprecedented Liberty he has taken, of making Indecent,

as well as Groundless Reflections, not only on my self, but most of those Gentlemen who had the Honour to command at Sea in the Expedition he treats of; I thought it proper to draw my Replications to a greater length: For things of that Nature do oft-times make too deep an Impression when they are not fully answered. And as I am apt to think that Colonel *Lillingston* did not imagine I would have set down silently, so am I well assured, that he has no reason to have such an Opinion of me.

It is that short Account which I have given in my *Memoirs*, of the Expedition to the *West-Indies*, when Captain *Wilmot* commanded the Squadron, that has led him to the trouble of a very long Narrative thereof, wherein he extolls the Actions of himself, and Officers, and condemns all the Proceedings of the Commadore, and the Gentlemen that were under his Command; and this, even at a time when most of them are either dead, or too far off to do justice to themselves.

For these Reasons I hold my self strictly obliged to say what I justly may in their behalf, as well as my own; but therein I shall not be influenced by the Method Colonel *Lillingston*

Pen has taken, for I am well assured it will be in my power to keep my own Pen within the Rules of Decency.

I think the first Pages of his Book may be pass'd over; for they only relate the manner of his being introduced into the Presence of the late King; his own Zeal to the Service, in accepting a Command which others declined; the strict Injunctions his Majesty was pleas'd to lay on him, to keep a good Correspondence with the Commander in Chief of the Squadron; the General Instructions to each of them; and the Rules set down for distributing what Booty should be taken. Wherefore I shall wave all these Matters, and proceed to answer what he has asserted in many Pages of his Book, that I had no Authority for what I have writ of the aforementioned Expedition; and this I shall first do, by the Copies of two Letters from Captain *Wilmot* to the then Lords of the Admiralty: After that, I will set before you an Extract of the Observations I drew therefrom, as well as from other Papers which then were, and now are in my Custody; from whence, if I mistake not, it will appear, that I had no great design of reflecting particularly on the

Actions of Colonel *Lillingston*. And
 Lastly, I will endeavour to answer, in
 the best manner I can, several Particu-
 lars contain'd in his Book, which re-
 late as well to my self, as the Gentle-
 men who were concern'd in the Expe-
 dition.

Copy of a Letter from Cap-
 tain *Robert Wilmot*, Dated
 in the Old Road of *St. Chri-
 stophers*, the 28th of *March*,
 1695,

THis comes by a small *Liverpooler*
 Man bound home, to acquaint their
 Lordships, that, God be thanked, I safely
 arrived here the 23d of *March*, 95, with
 all the Men of War and Transports, the
Swan excepted, I having sent her (accon-
 ding to their Lordships Orders) to *St. Do-
 mingo*, and to meet me at the Island of
Savona, lying at the Eastermost end of
Hispaniola; so that if the Governor of
St. Domingo is ready to march over Land
 to *Port de Paix*, I can then go to the
 North side of the Island, and Assault it by
 Sea; but if I should go down to *St. Do-
 mingo*,

mingo, or on the South side, it's impossible in a Month's time to get up with the Transports.

This day I shall sail for Savona, having furnished our selves with good Water, our Beer being done. By the Enclosed you'll find the Condition of the Men of War, and Fireships; there are dead of the Soldiers 140, and 200 and odd Sick, so that at this Minute were we to land, there would be scarce 1700 out of 1200.

I shall use my utmost to do what in me lies to further the Design, and his Majesty's Service; but by a small Dutch Man that was taken out of Camoret Bay, I am informed the French General had, before my arrival in those Parts, an Account of the Queen's Death, and dally expected to hear of my being at Hispaniola; so expect all the Strength they have is got together.

The first Opportunity after any thing happens, shall give you an Account, and hope you believe nothing shall be wanting to further the present Expedition that lies in the power of,

Honoured Sir,

Your, &c.

[7]
the remainder of the
of the North side of the said
[69]
Copy of a Letter from Cap-
tain Robert Wilmot, dated
on board his Majesty's Ship
the *Dunkirk* in Port-Royal
Harbour in Jamaica, July,
1695, and directed to the
Secretary of the Admiralty.

M*I last to you was from the Island
of St. Christophers, by a small
Leverpoole Man, wherein I desired you
to acquaint their Lordships of my being
then bound to the Island of Savona, on
the East end of the Island of Hispaniola,
in order to meet with the Swan, that I
had before sent, (according to their Lord-
ships Orders) with Letters to the Governor
of St. Domingo, and accordingly did meet
with the said Swan, with a Letter from
the said Governor, directed to me, to tell
me, that if I would come down to treat
with him, at St. Domingo, he would give
me all the necessary Assistance towards the
Destroying the Enemy on that Coast. I
accordingly did sail with three Men of War,
and one Fireship, to the Port of St. Do-
mingo, and sent the Transport-Ships, with
the*

the remainder of the Fleet, to the Gulph of Samina, on the North side of the said Island, being a very Commodious Place for Shipping, abounding with abundance of Fish, good Water and Wood; and upon my arrival at the Port of St. Domingo, the Grand Fort saluted me with Eleven Guns, and I made the like return. At my landing I was received by the Lieutenant-General of the Army, and the Council of that Island, with about 500 Men in Arms, with a Compliment, That the Gates of St. Domingo was open, and that I commanded; and this I must say, that we were treated with much Grandeur and Respect, the President of St. Domingo meeting me at his outward Gate, and from thence we walked into his House, where I delivered the Letters I had for him, and desired his immediate Assistance to destroy the Enemy on the Coast of Hispaniola, which he seem'd readily to agree to, but found him very dilatory, in raising abundance of insignificant Scruples, which with much difficulty, and twelve Days time, I reconciled, and then agreed, That he should forthwith March with 1700 Men to Manchaneel Bay, on the North side of the said Island, where I was to meet him with the Fleet; and then (according to our said Agreement with the President) we sailed to Cape François,

being the Windermost Settlement the French have, the Spaniards with 150 English marching by Land; the remainder of our English Soldiers I put on Shore within three Leagues of the said Cape, and then sailed with the Men of War directly within Gun-shot of the Fort of Cape Francois.

Saturday the 18th of May they fired very much upon us from the said Fort, insomuch that the Swan received considerable Damage, being disabled in her Bowspit, &c. It was concluded that as soon as the Land-Forces could march to one end of the Town, we, with our Ships, should be ready to batter the Fort; and we also intended to assault the back of the Fort, (which had, in that, and Platformes, 40 Guns mounted) with the Seamen, the Ground being higher than the Fort on the back side.

That Evening we went in our Boats, to view a convenient Place to land the said Seamen, and going close into a Bay, a Party of Men laid under Cover, and fired very thick upon us, but, as it happen'd, kill'd no body.

The next Evening we went with a greater Strength, which the Enemy perceiving from the Fort and Town, believ'd that we were going to Land, and blew up the Fort, and burnt the Town; upon which I sent immediately

mediately on Shore, and found that the Fort and Town was Deserted: And in all the Houses where there was any Goods and Plunder, they had laid Traines of Powder to blow us up, which had like to have done our Men great Damage. I being there my self, beat the Men all out, and in doing so, had like to have been blown up my self, being just come out as a House blew up. Captain Launce being behind me, received much Damage, but now is pretty well recovered.

The next day, being Monday the 21st of May, Colonel Lillingston and the Spaniards marched into the Town, where he found, upon the Fort, the King of England's Colours Flying, which I put up. My Colours were taken down, and he suffered the Spaniards to put up theirs, upon which I sent on Shoar, and asked Colonel Lillingston why he suffered that? He replied he had spoke to the Spanish General, which was all he could do; and was so severe upon the Seamen that had any Greens, Oranges, or Fresh Provisions, which they got in the Woods, as to give Orders to take it away from them, (which they did) and if the Seamen refused it, to shoot them, swearing that all that was upon Hispaniola was his.

The

The next day I sent to the Spanish General, to know when he would prepare to go to Port de Paix, according to our former Agreement; upon which a Consultation was called, and there agreed on, That Major Lillingston should, with 300 English Men, march with the Spaniards to Port de Paix, being fourteen Leagues distant, as they told me, and five days march; but Colonel Lillingston, without any other Consultation, marched with all the English Army, in order to plunder the Country; which Fatigue (as I am informed) destroyed most of his Men; but I was kept a stranger to his Proceedings, for from this time he never came to any Council of War, though often desired, but did as he pleased with his Forces.

Tuesday the 11th of June, not hearing from Colonel Lillingston since his March from Cape François, being sixteen days, I called a Council of War, and thought it reasonable to propose, that we should land 400 Seamen, in order to gain Communication with the Land-Forces, having reason to believe (they being wanting so many days) that the Enemy had cut off their Communication, it being thought but five days March. It was agreed at the said Council of War, that we should forthwith land with 400 Men, which we did about
five

five miles to the Eastward of Port de Paix, where I received some little opposition by an Ambuscade, but forced them quickly to retire, and burnt and destroyed the Enemy's Plantations to the Fort of Port de Paix, which they all went into; but not gaining any knowledge where our Army was, I retired with my Men on board that Evening.

Saturday the 15th of June, gaining knowledge that the Land Army was near Port de Paix, I landed, and marched with 400 Seamen to meet them, which I did; and on the next day landed their Mortars, and Cannon, where they desired; but two or three days after found the Cannon lying where they were landed, and nothing done. I called a Council of War, in order to contrive the speedy reduction of this Fort; and it was the Opinion of the Council of War, That Colonel Lillingston should be requested to hasten the mounting his Mortars, and Cannon, in proper Places; and be had assistance of Men enow from the Spaniard, as well as us. It was also the Opinion of the Council of War, That we should forthwith sail to the Westward of Port de Paix, near a fresh Water River, where was a very Commodious Hill to annoy the Enemy, and almost as near again as where Colonel Lillingston intended his Battery; and, also, That we should land ten pieces of Cannon, and
make

make a Battery on the Top of the aforesaid Hill, which I very soon did; and it lying so commodious, proved very prejudicial to the Enemy, insomuch, that in a few days I beat down part of the inward Fort, which was the Place of refuge, and killed a great many People; and we did continually throw in Hand-Bombs.

On the 3d of July, between Twelve and One a Clock at Night, the French sallied out, in a Body of 300 Whites, and 200 Negroes, well armed; but I having notice by a Negro, of their Intention, did dispatch 150 Men in readines to receive them, and my self, with the remainder of my Men, lay ready to join them, which accordingly we did upon the Enemy's advance, killed many in the Fight, and took several Prisoners, most of their Commanding Officers being killed: And after I had beaten them, I took possession of the Fort, where I found 80 pieces of Cannon mounted, with good store of Powder and Shot. All this while Colonel Lillingston, with the Land-Forces, did not give me any Assistance, (though sent to) and lay nearer the Enemy than we did, but commanded all his Men on board; upon which I called a Council of War to deliberate, and direct Colonel Lillingston, to send his sick Men down to Jamaica, and to keep the well Men and Officers there, to further his

his Majesty's Service at Logan and Petit-Guavas, which he positively refused to do, and the Spanish General, notwithstanding my Agreement with the Governor of St. Domingo, which was, That after the Destruction of Cape François, and Port de Paix, whatsoever Men remained, (if they were but two) they should march to the Destruction of Logan and Petit-Guavas, they now refused it, under pretensions of their Men being sick; so that being left by Colonel Lillingston, and the Spaniards, I could in no probability keep the Fort; and by the continual Fatigue that the Seamen have had, they were scarce able to demolish it, but with continual labour we got the Guns and Stores off, blew up the inward Fort, and demolished the Outward one, and then sailed for Jamaica, where I now am, but under very bad Circumstances, as to the Health of our Men, occasion'd by the greatness of the Work they have done; which if not, must have been left undone.

The Ship this comes by had received the Governor's Dispatches before I came, and I found her riding at the Keys ready to be gone, but stopt her a few Hours to give their Lordships this Account.

The Passengers being on board the Ship bound for England, and in haste to be gone, I cannot send their Lordships Copies of the Councils

Councils of War, and what's necessary in
form, but here is a Brigantine that will sail
in few days, and in all probability will be
home before this Ship, by which I shall give
their Lordships a fuller Satisfaction that I
have thoroughly done my Duty, and followed
their Lordship's Commands, which I shall
continue to do to the utmost power of,

Honoured Sir,

Yours, &c.

Robt. Wilmot,

Postscript,

I have brought down about 150 French
Soldiers that were in Arms, and as near as
we can guess there were about 350 killed at
Cape Francois and Port de Paix.

Extract

*Extract out of Mr. Burchet's
Memoirs relating Captain
Wilmot's Expedition to the
West-Indies the last War.*

Pursuant to these Instructions, Captain *Wilmot* sailed from *Plimouth*, and arriving in the old Road of *St. Christophers*, one of the *Leeward-Islands*, departed from thence the 28th of *March* 1694. for the Island of *Savona*, which lies at the Eastermost end of *Hispaniola*, intending, if the Governour of *St. Domingo* was ready, to march to *Port de Paix*, to sail on the West side of the Island and assault it by Sea, which he could not have been able to do, had he gone down to *St. Domingo*, or on the South side, because it would have been a great hinderance to the Transport Ships, which sailed very ill, and could not so well keep a Wind.

The *French* at this time had 19 *Privateers* out of *Guardalupe* and *Martinico*, and three Ships of War, one of 44 Guns, another of 40, and a third, a small *Dutch Ship* which they had taken
at

at *Camoret Bay*; and those Privateers were chiefly supported by such Merchant Ships and Vessels of Ours as they frequently took, laden with Provisions for the Islands: Besides, the *French General* had notice of his coming, and daily expected him at *Hispaniola*, where they had mustered all their Strength together, notwithstanding the great Care taken at home for keeping the Expedition Private.

When the Squadron arrived at *Savona*, the Commadore met with a Letter from the Governour of *St. Domingo*, letting him know, That if he would come there he should be assisted in attempting the Enemy on that Coast; upon which he sailed with three of his Ships, and two Fireships, and sent the Transports with the remainder of the Squadron to the *Gulph of Samina*, on the North side of the Island.

When he landed, he desired the assistance of the President of *St. Domingo*, and delivered to him the *King of Spain's* Letters; but although he made at first a shew of Readiness to comply therewith, yet (like a right *Spaniard*) he soon rais'd *Insignificant* Scruples, by which *twelve* days time was lost. Then indeed

indeed it was agreed that he should forthwith march with 1700 of his Men, and 150 *English*, to *Machaneel Bay*, on the North side of the Island, and that the *Squadron* should meet him there.

Accordingly the *Squadron* sailed to *Cape Francois*, which was the very Windermost Settlement the *French* had; and when the Commadore had put on Shoar the rest of the *English* Forces within three Leagues of the *Cape*, he sailed directly within Gun-shot of the Fort; from whence they fired very warmly at our Ships, and in some measure disabled one of them, the *Swan*.

It was concluded, That so soon as the Soldiers could march to one end of the Town, the Ships should batter the Fort, whereon was mounted 40 Guns, and that the Seamen should assault the back of it, the Ground there being higher than the Fort it self. In order to this a convenient Place was sought for to land at; but we were repulsed: However, the next Evening they went with a greater Strength, and the Enemy thinking that we did then intend to Land, blew up the Fort and burnt the Town, laying Trains of
C Powder

Powder to the Houses where any Plunder was, which had like to have done much Mischief to our Men.

Major
Lilling-
ston.

The next day the Commadore sent to the *Spanish General*, to know when he could be ready to go to *Port de Paix*: And upon his Answer, and a Consultation, it was agreed that the Colonel * who Commanded the Land Forces should march thither with 300 *English*, in Company of the *Spanish* Forces, it being (as they said) about 14 Leagues off. But either the said Colonel thought it not proper to undertake this Affair, or for some other reason it was laid aside, and the Men Straggled up and down the Country for Plunder, by which means several of them were lost.

The Commadore not hearing from the Forces since they marched from *Cape François*, called a Council of War, and propos'd the Landing 400 Seamen, to see if they could gain Communication with them; for he had reason to doubt they were in hazard. Accordingly such a Number of Men were landed about five Miles Eastward of *Port de Paix*; and though they received some Opposition by an *Ambuscade*, yet they Burnt and Destroyed the Enemy's Plantations to the very Fort

Fort it self, to which the *French* retired. But not hearing any thing from the Soldiers, they came on Board the Ships again at Night.

Soon after, the Commadore had notice that the *Army* had *Straggled up* near *Port de Paix*, whereupon he landed again the like Number of Seamen, as before, in order to join them, and the next day put on Shoar the Cannon and Mortars; but little haste was made in mounting them, by those whose proper Business it was.

It was now resolved, that the Squadron should sail Westward of *Port de Paix*, where there was a commodious Hill to annoy the Enemy, and it was much nearer than the first intended Battery; and there 10 Pieces of Cannon were mounted, which so much gauled them, that in few days part of the inward Fort was beaten down, and many People, who retired thither, were killed.

The 3d of *July* 1695, between the hours of Twelve and one, the *French* sailed out, with about 300 Whites, and 200 Negroes, well Armed; but the Commadore having notice thereof by a Negro, detached 150 Men to receive them, and lay ready, with the

rest, to join them upon occasion; by which means many were killed, especially their Commanding Officers, and several taken Prisoners. After this Defeat our Forces immediately took Possession of the Fort, wherein they found 80 Cannon mounted, and good Store of Powder and Shot.

The Colonel of the Land-Forces was soon after desired to send his Sick Men to *Jamaica*, and to keep those that were in Health at this Place, to assist in the intended Service at *Logan* and *Petit-Guavas*; but neither he, or the Spanish General thought it adviseable: Wherefore the Commadore demolished the Fort, and carried off the Guns and Stores, and then sailed to *Jamaica*, where having refitted the Ships, and put all things into the best order he could, he took his Departure for *England* the 3d day of *September*, leaving behind him the *Reserve*, *Hampshire*, *Ruby* and *Swan*, the last to bring home some Merchant Ships when loaden, and the three first (being Fourth Rates) to Guard *Jamaica* till further Order; but such Difficulties they met with in their Passage, not only by reason of the bad Weather, but the Violent and uncommon Distemper that seized the

the Men, that it was almost next to a Miracle the Ships got home; and Captain *Wilmot* the Commadore, and a great Number of the Officers, died in the Passage; and one of the Fourth Rates, for want of Men to trim her Sails, ran on ground, and was lost on the Shoals of Cape *Florida*.

HAVING gone thus far towards satisfying Col. *Lillingston*, that I wanted not Vouchers for what I have writ, I shall make this short Remark, That although I cannot, from my own knowledge, assert the Validity of Captain *Wilmot's* Letters, or other Papers I shall refer to, yet I must confess I had no great Scruple, whether a Gentleman who had so long born Commissions in the Navy as he had done, and whose Character inclin'd the then Lords of the Admiralty to recommend him to his late Majesty for the Command of the Squadron, deserv'd to be credited, at least in what he had so solemnly given under his Hand to his Superiors; but yet it will appear that I have handled this Point with no little tenderness; for I well knew that frequent Disputes had happen'd between Sea and Land Officers, when joined together for carrying

rying on Services of like nature ; and since Captain *Wilmot* was principally concerned in this, I did only barely mention some Particulars of his Letter, without either intending, or actually making any immediate Reflection on Colonel *Lillingston*, (whose Name is not so much as mention'd) either as to his Conduct, or otherwise : And as I have hitherto, by natural Inclination, endeavour'd to avoid giving any Man just occasion of Offence, so will I never have so mean an Opinion of my self, as to believe that groundless Reflections can wound my Reputation.

I might, indeed, as Colonel *Lillingston* observes in one part of the Preface to his Book, have inform'd my self from him of all things which were remarkable during the Expedition ; but as I neither had then, or now have, any manner of Acquaintance with him ; so had he furnished me with such Materials, and I, with an implicate Faith, published them, and quoted him for my Author, the Account could not have carried with it a less Air of Partiality than he would have it now to do : And as it might, on the one Hand, have given him Satisfaction, so would the Gentlemen of the Sea, on the other, have

have had very good Reason to think themselves injur'd.

Besides, should the most discerning Man endeavour to make himself entirely Master of an Affair of this Nature, by gathering the Sentiments of all intelligible Persons, who were concern'd both on the one side and the other, it would be next to an Impossibility to draw such Conclusions therefrom as might meet with a general Approbation. For which reason I did, when I took the trouble of Collecting and Writing my *Memoirs of Transactions at Sea the last War*, take particular Care to mention nothing more of the Land-Service, than was absolutely necessary to make the other Intelligible: For things of that Nature are as far from my Talent, as I believe those of the Sea are from Colonel *Lillingston's*. Neither was I absolutely govern'd by Captain *Wilmot's* Letters, in relation to the Expedition; for I had then by me, and now have, not only the Original Journals of the Captains and Officers in the Squadron, but other Papers which do in a very great measure confirm what is contain'd therein, with respect as well to the Services perform'd by them, and their Men, as the Motions of the Land-For-

ces; Extracts of which Journals I shall insert in the latter Part of my Book, and place them in such Order, as that they may be most easily referred unto. 'Tis not for me, that was not in the Action, to determine which Accounts border the nearest on Truth; and therefore I leave it to the Reader to judge thereof according to his own Discretion; but this may be observed, that since there were very early, as well as unhappy Disputes between the Commodore and Colonel *Lillingston*, may it not be reasonable to think each of them have laid the load too heavy on the other?

In the 8th Page of his Book, he charges Captain *Wilmot* with breaking open his Instructions, before he came to the determin'd Place for doing it, viz. the Latitude of 40; the which Irregularity the Colonel says was done when there was none present but himself, but that he made them up again, and then spreads the Signal for his Officers to come on board, that so he might communicate their Contents to them.

I shall not take the Colonel's Method of directly contradicting him in this Particular, but on the contrary must own, that it was very unjustifiable in
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the Commadore; though it appears very strange, that he should have so great an Itch to look into his Instructions, contrary to the positive Orders which he actually did receive from the Lords of the Admiralty, and the more so, for that he might have done it without blame, had he refrain'd some few days longer: But yet it is not alledg'd (allowing it to be Fact) that the Service did receive any prejudice thereby.

I am beholden to the Colonel for his allowing there is something true in my Book relating to this Expedition, and that is, the Distribution of Plunder; but he adds, and very often repeats it, that by Captain *Wilmot's* Disposition of things, neither himself, or any of the Officers under his Command, got any Part of it. This was indeed a hard Case; for since there was Booty before both the one and the other, ill luck attended the Land-Forces, if no share of it came to their Hands. But if the Sailers did get more timely to it, 'tis possible they had not so great a regard to the Distribution, as to judge that what they exposed their Lives for, they might not reasonably esteem their own, and carry off; and as it has been
always

always so, neither I, nor any Man can Answer for it, that it will not be just the same hereafter.

The Colonel says, in Page 24, that on the 27th of January, a Transport Ship called the *Terra Nova* Sprung her Fore-top-mast, and being by that means left a-stern of the Squadron, he represented to the Commadore the Inconvenience that might attend the Service should she miscarry; but that it was with great difficulty he prevailed with him to send a Frigate to Tow her to the Fleet. Now admitting that this Ship was at some distance a-stern (as frequently Merchant Ships either willfully or negligently are) is it reasonable to think that the Commadore, who must have been also Sensible of what Consequence it was to the Service to carry her with him, would have run the hazard of his Ruine by willfully leaving her behind? Certainly no Man, who had thoughts of seeing his Country again, could have been guilty of so much Indiscretion; and I am apt to believe, that whatever Riches he got in the *West-Indies*, his Design was not to enjoy it there, by sucking in that unwholesome Air as long as he Liv'd. It is therefore reasonable to think, that he

he who was undoubtedly the best Judge in what manner, and when, to provide for the Security of this Ship, would have taken the necessary Care of her, without being incited thereunto, when he found it might be most conveniently done: But even this whole matter is represented quite contrary to what the Colonel Reports of it. For it appears by a Letter from Captain *Butler*, that he being separated from the Squadron, with the *Firebrand* Fireship, and both of them Chasing, he came up with six Sail of the Transport Ships, one of which was this very *Terra Nova*, which Colonel *Lillingston* mentions, and that he, without any application made to him, towed her several hundred Leagues. Nay so very disorderly were many of the Transport Ships, that they were for running directly to *Jamaica*, before they had landed the Forces and Ammunition, which had they done, it would have been of the greatest ill Consequence to the whole Service: And very difficult it was for Captain *Butler* to quell the Mutiny that happen'd among the Soldiers on Board them.

To which may be added, That soon after the Squadron sailed from the *Madera's*,

dera's, the Ensign was hoisted on Board one of the Transport Ships, called the *Jefferys*, and a Gun fired, as a Sigal to the others to follow her ; and this was not only repeated some few days after, but the Soldiers who were on Board her threatned to fire into the Fireship, as well as the *Winchester*, if they gave them any Interruption ; insomuch that some of the Land Officers who Commanded those Soldiers, were (as I am informed) Tried at a Court Martial, and broke.

He says in Page 26, That when a Signal was made on the 4th of *February*, for all the Sea and Land Captains to come on Board the *Dunkirk*, his Captain Lieutenant came with the rest, as a Captain, and that the Commadore did not only refuse his Sitting at the Council of War, but caused his Men to turn him out of the Cabbin. I confess I know not well the Custom of the Land in these Cases ; but the little insight I have in Sea-Discipline inclines me to believe the Commadore thought himself very much in the right, when he refused this Gentleman's Sitting in consultation with the rest of the Officers ; besides, I am almost

almost assured, that it never was Practised either before or since at Sea, whatever it may have been at Land, and (if I mistake not) it plainly appears by the Instructions to the Colonel, and the Commadore, that none under the Degree of a Captain was to be admitted to such Consultations: But if Captain *Wilmot* did, upon this Score Treat the Gentleman uncivily, I shall be far from justifying him, even though he had been in some measure provoked thereunto.

But this whole Matter does appear unto me to be thus, from the Journal kept by Commissary *Murray*. There was, says he, a Council of War held on board the Commadore; and among other Matters it happened a Soldier was to be Tryed for Mutiny. I was called in by the Land Officers to perform the part of Judge Advocate; but finding that Captain *Wilmot* did insist on the Judge Advocate as well as President, pursuant to the Instructions he had from the Admiralty, and that Colonel *Lillingston* had no Instructions for either, I told the Colonel that since Captain *Wilmot* alone had the Powers to Præside, and call Courts Martial, he was in
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the right to have Criminals Tryed this way, and so withdrew. Commissary *Murray* adds; About 3 hours after, I was called in again, there happening a furious Debate between the Land and Sea Officers about the Admittance of Captain Lieutenant *Warner* to be a Member of their Councils, the latter having, by Plurality of Votes, carried it against him; and my Opinion being asked in this Case, I did inform Captain *Wilmot*, that it was the undoubted Right of Lieutenant *Warner* to take his Place as youngest Captain, it being the Practice of the Land Army; and therefore if his Orders were to admit none under the Degree of Captains, it might be of ill Consequence to the King's Service, if the Land Officers insisted on it: Whereupon Captain *Wilmot* ordered the Resolution about Mr. *Warner* to be rased out.

In Page 27, He gives an Account, That the Commadore took him into his Apartment, and expressed very great Dissatisfaction at the Contents of his Instructions, and let him know that it might be depended on, he would not go to the West-Indies to learn the Language, but that he would mind his own Business, however
Things

Things went. And this, or somewhat to the same Purpose, the Colonel says, he repeated at the Madera's, when he had Drank pretty freely; inſomuch that he could do no otherwiſe than reflect on his Miſfortune, in being join'd with ſo unhappy a Colleague, who was not only a Man of no Temper, or Manners, but a Murtherer, (for it ſeems he had acquainted him with his Miſfortune of killing a Man) One who had been a ———, and was reſolved to be a Thief.

Theſe are, indeed, very home Reflections; but admitting that ſomething like what is alledged was Spoken by the Commadore, (for who can contradict it when there was none preſent but they two?) what can be inferred from his ſaying that he would endeavour to do his own Buſineſs? Could he enrich himſelf any other way than by Diſpoyling the Enemy? And was not all the Forces, both of Sea and Land, ſent abroad for that very purpoſe? But it will plainly appear by the Extracts of the ſeveral Journals at the end of my Book, that he was not wholly led away by Self-Interſt, but that he, and his Officers, as well as the Men under his Command, did Zealouſly, and faithfully, and with no
ſmall

small hazard, promote the Service of their King and Country during the whole Expedition: And (with Submission) I think he little deserves the Character of a Thief, for bringing away with him what he ventured his Life to gain, and which bears no manner of Proportion (as I am credibly inform'd) to what Colonel *Lillingston* has Estimated it at. But more of this Matter about the Plunder in it's proper Place.

As to the other Reflection, upon the score of his killing a Man, I know not why any Man, especially a Soldier, should give that unfortunate Accident the Term of Murder; for 'tis evident that Captain *Wilmot* did it in his own Defence; That he fairly stood Tryal, even at his own Request; and that he was acquitted according to the Laws of our Country.

The other Crime which Colonel *Lillingston* hath thus ——— laid to his Charge, is yet wholly in the Dark; but I am apt to think a Word was wanting to fill up the Blank, otherwise it would not have been left to guess, as now it is.

In Page 30, He inveighs against the Commadore, for leaving him and some of his Officers behind, at the *Madera's*, and lets us know that himself and they did afterwards follow the Squadron in the *Ruby* and *Reserve*. I do indeed agree with him, that such a Proceeding was not only very unaccountable, but unpardonable too: But I must make his Observation concerning it, before I proceed to explain the whole matter to you; That as he waited for the Return of the Commadore's Barge, both that night and the next day, and for want of Boats was not able to get on Board the Squadron when the Signal was made for sailing, so does he own, in Page 33, that he no sooner discover'd the two Frigats beforemention'd, than he provided Boats, and went off with his Officers. But the matter is otherwise represented to me, and that the Colonel may be satisfied who is my Author, 'tis Captain *Butler*, who held one of the best Ranks in the Squadron; nor am I in want of another Account which confirms it.

He says, That when the Squadron Anchored in *Funchall* Road, at the Island of *Madera*, Colonel *Lillingston*
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was on Shoar with all, or the greatest part of his Officers, buying Wine and other Things, some of which was Shipt off on Board the Merchant Vessels: But that the Wind coming out of the Sea, it occasioned so great a swell that the Ships were all forced out of the Road, and run no little hazard, insomuch that they were separated, and join'd not again 'till they reached *St. Christophers*. In this disorder he says the Colonel and his Officers were left behind, but that they had the very same Opportunity of getting off as the Sea Officers had, for that neither Boats nor Conveniencies were wanting, there being not less than two from each Ship. Captain *Bntler* adds that he himself went off with all his three Boats empty, except his Longboat that had Water in; and that as his Eight Oar'd Boat, which had nothing in but the Coxwain and Crew, was capable of carrying 8 Sitters, so did no more take Passage in that Boat which Rowed with Eleven Oars, then himself and Commissary *Murrey*; whereas in her the Colonel and all his Officers might have had a Convenience, if he had asked it. Besides (as my Author hath informed me) there was not only the Boats of
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the Ships of War on Shoar, but those of the Merchant Ships, and many Fishing-Boats riding by their Grapnels near the Beach before the Town.

As for the two Ships which came afterwards into the Road, and in which the Colonel and his Officers followed the Squadron, be pleas'd to observe, That these Ships, the *Ruby* and *Reserve*, lay more to Windward than the rest did, and thereby had an opportunity of getting out, and plying Eastward, before the Storm came on so violently, which the others could not do; inso-much that when all the Squadron came out to Sea, those two Ships, with some of the Merchant Men, got out of Sight to the East, and so gain'd the North side of the Island, while the rest were pulled with their Anchors, and forced to make a hard shift to get with safety Westward: And at this time the Weather was so bad (as I am informed) that it was impossible for a Boat to be sent on Shoar for Colonel *Lillinsten*, without the most apparent hazard of drowning the Men; nor indeed can any Boats or Vessels deal with the Shoar there, when the Winds blow hard Southerly, as then they did. Wherefore I must confess, that were my

Opinion to be asked, as the Case is Stated, I should freely give it thus, That it was of much more Consequence to the Service, for the Sea Commanders to repair on Board, and endeavour to preserve their Ships, than the leaving Colonel *Lillingston* and his Officers on Shoar could be: For as the Expedition was not to be carried on without the Ships of War, and their Conducting the Forces to the Place of Action, so is it reasonable to think (without any Reflection on the Colonel, and the Gentlemen who were with him) that others might have been found in the Regiment to have done the Duty; otherwise how could the Service have been performed, if the Colonel and those Gentlemen had Died in their Passage?

And for a further Account of this Matter I do refer to the Extract of Commissary *Murrey's* Journal inserted at the latter part of the Book.

I know not for what Reason he says in Page 34, That I have attributed the whole Conduct of the Voyage to Captain *Wilmot*; but if he means that part which relates to the Squadron, I think I have done him but bare Justice; for I presume the Colonel did not think he had any colourable Authority to inter-

intermeddle therein. True it is, the more immediate Conduct of the Land-Forces was committed to him: But why he should esteem the Squadron to be only sent to Convoy and Pilot him and the Forces, to cover his Landing, and assist him, if there was occasion, I know not; for as the Commadore's Instructions enjoin'd him to Attack and endeavour to Destroy the Enemy, with his Officers and Men, in the same manner as Colonel *Lillingston's* did, so will it appear, by the Extracts of the Journals hereafter inserted, that what was done on Shoar by them, did, in a very great measure, conduce to the speedy effecting the whole Service which was performed.

It is said in Page 38, That *contrary to his Majesty's particular Directions, the Commadore did, both at Antegoa, and at Mount-Serrat, take the liberty not only of going on shoar, but of telling publicly what he was come for, and whither he was going; and that more than this, Captain Butler of the Winchester, a Third Rate, (though I suppose the Colonel meant a Fourth) sailed along the Coast of Guardalupe, and fired several Shot on Shoar; whereas their Orders were not to have let them know of*

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their being there, till they had seen them on the Coast.

It may not be improper to observe, That the People at *Antegoa* and *Mount-Serrat* (two of our *Leeward Islands*) were Subjects of this Kingdoms; and that consequently the communicating his Design to them could do no hurt, but rather give them considerable Encouragement. Nor could Captain *Butler's* firing on the Coast of *Guardalupe* be attended with any other Inconvenience (I think) than the loss of Powder and Shot; for as the Enemy there could not probably send timely Assistance to *Cape Francois*, before the Squadron and the Land-Forces arrived, and were in Condition to make the design'd Attempt; so were not our Arms bent against *Guardalupe* after the Success at *Port de Paix*. But as to this matter of Captain *Butler's* firing on Shoar, he assures me it was no otherwise than this, That falling, in the Night-time, so far in between *Guardalupe* and *Dominico*, that he could not get about *Desfado*, by reason of the Trade-wind and Current, it was agreed to put for it between the Islands, and to keep as near *Guardalupe* as they could, to the end he might, by rounding the Point into the Road, cut off a
French

French Merchant Ship, of about 500 Tuns, from *Martinico*, bound to *France*. As soon as he came within Shot of this Ship, he found the Town was giving all possible help towards the getting her nearer under the Castle; Whereupon he fired (as he informs me) about six Shot at her, which was return'd by the Castle and Fort; and finding they had got the Ship into security, he left her, and bent his Course for *St. Christophers*. Now, what Alarm this single Ship could give of the Approach of a Squadron, and an Army, is the question.

The Colonel, in the 44th Page of his Book, relates the civil Treatment he received from the Governor of *St. Domingo*; but yet he will find by Captain *Wilmot's* Letter, as I do by several other Papers in my Custody, that I had some Authority for saying what I have done in that Affair, namely, That like a true Spaniard, he rais'd needless Scruples; and therefore Colonel *Lillingston* might have spared his Reflections in Page 45, which are neither fit for one Gentleman to make, or another not to resent: And whatever Opinion he may have of his own, or of my Qualifications to bear the Character of an Author,

he does me wrong, if he imagines I will ever decline justifying my Reputation.

I must own, that when I read that part of Captain *Wilmot's* Letter, which relates to the Gentleman who govern'd *St. Domingo*, I was not much surpriz'd at it; for I well knew the ill Condition the *Spanish* Nation was then in (whatever they may be now) for Action, either at home or abroad; nor was I less sensible that they had not, on several occasions, afforded us any great help, even when our Forces were keeping the Wolf from their very Door.

If this Governor of *St. Domingo* had positive Instructions from his Master to treat and consult with Colonel *Lillingston*, and him only, he was undoubtedly in the right strictly to obey; but it is somewhat strange, that when his late Majesty's Instructions obliged the *Commadore*, and the Colonel, to Consult all things at a Council of War, the *Spanish* Governor was not likewise required by his Master to consult with him; but more especially in relation to the Squadron's Landing the Forces, moving from one place to another for their Security, when on Shoar, and in the joyning a number of Seamen, or acting

acting separately with them, when it should be necessary for carrying on the Service; for I must be of opinion, that both the *Spaniards*, and our Forces, would have been much to seek had they wanted such Assistance.

Nor can I alter my mind, That the twelve Days were ill spent, (whoever was the occasion of it) ere the Commadore was admitted to their Consultations: For to me it appears that the *Scruples* were unnecessary; but it seems Colonel *Lillingston* did at last reconcile the Governor to it, and owns in Page 47, that till then *all things were at a full stand*.

In the 48th Page are inserted the Articles agreed on between himself, the Commadore, and the *Spanish* General, in relation to Plunder, and other things that were thought necessary for creating a general Satisfaction; by which it seems (at least it does so to me) that the Commadore inclined to make all things easy, rather than be the occasion of Difficulties and Interruptions to the Service.

Soon after this it is said, That he pressed the Commadore to Sail from *Samina-Bay*, the 22d of *April*, that so they might be ready to meet the *Spaniards*,

ards; but that he *lattered away six Days*, and employed them in diverting himself, by rowing along Shore, and entertaining the Ladies. Now, although Colonel Lillingston did thus endeavour to quicken him, yet 'tis very probable that several Accidents prevented the Squadron's Sailing: Nay, it appears by the Journals of the Sea-Officers, that on the 22d there was little Wind, or for the most part Calm; That the Weather was Cloudy the next day, with Lightning and much Rain. The 24th 'twas Cloudy with Rain, as the Day following was, with Thunder and Lightning; That it was dark Weather the 26th, with Rain, Lightning, and Thunder; and that at Five the next Morning the Signal was made to Unmoor, though they could not get under Sail by reason it was Calm. Besides, the Ships were in want of Water, which in this time they supply'd themselves with; and what Diversion either the Ladies, or the Comadore, could take upon the Water in Weather like this, I cannot imagine.

In Page 51, a very great stress is laid on the Spanish Admiral's forwardness to promote the Service, by taking down his Flag so soon as he came into the Squadron,

Squadron, and riding only with a broad Pendant; but the Colonel has told us before, that our Commadore was to Command him, and he would have made but a very indifferent Figure with a broad Pendant only, while the other's Flag was flying: But as the *Spanish* Admiral did at first desire to Command the Squadron one Day, and our Commadore another, and would never have taken in his Flag, had not his Instructions positively obliged him to it; so if he and the Governor of *St. Domingo* were the very self same Person, then have I indeed charged him with making *insignificant Seruples*; but if it so happen'd that they were two, (as I have reason to believe they were) it will not be found that I have said any thing concerning him of that nature.

I had no design to affront Colonel *Lillingston* by a Passage he takes notice of in Page 52, which is this, *That it was agreed at a Consultation he should Land with 300 Men, and March with the Spaniards*; for I was not then, nor am I now, so well skilled in Land-Affairs, as to know it was an improper thing for the Colonel of a Regiment (whatever it may be to a Commander in Chief)

Chief) to March on an immediate Service with such a Body of Men; but I do freely own my mistake, by having misplaced the Title of *Colonel* for that of the *Major*, his Brother, who did actually March with the aforesaid Soldiers.

If I am rightly informed, there were great Difficulties rais'd about Landing the Regiment at *Cape François*; That Proposals were made about regular Marches, Formalities, and the like; and that thereupon a Council of War was call'd of all the Sea and Land-Officers, before whom the Commadore laid the Inconveniencies which might attend such Proceedings; for that the Vi&ualling would grow short; that all the Trading Ships which Transported the Forces were to be dispatch'd to *Jamacia*, and that Delays might not only occasion want in the end, but give the Enemy too great an Opportunity of Fortifying themselves. These and many other things, it is said, were urged and debated, and that it was carried by a Majoriry, that Colonel *Lillingston* should Land with his Regiment the next day; for the 1500 *Spaniards* were already arrived, and had posted themselves at some distance from *Cape François*. Cap-
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ain Butler was (as his Letters shew) the Officer appointed by the Comma-
dore to Land the Forces, which he
says he did by the Assistance of all the
Boats in the Squadron, and so near the
Castle, that their Cannon reached over
them; and this is confirmed by the
Journals of the Sea-Officers.

It was then believed, That Colonel
Lillingston and the Spaniards would have
been able to perform the Service with-
out any great Difficulty; for as the
greatest Strength of the Castle was to-
wards the Sea, so did the Officers of the
Squadron put themselves and their Men
in a Body in their Boats, with Pattere-
roes and Small Arms, and attempted
several times to Land on the Sea-side of
the Castle, intending thereby to draw
that way, at least, a part of the Gari-
son, while the Soldiers Attackt them on
the contrary side.

I am Credibly informed that the
small Shot flew among the Sea Officers,
and their Men, very thick, and that
several of them were spoiled; but
night coming on they stood off to their
Ships. A little while after the Castle
was seen to blow up, and thereupon
the Seamen, with their Officers, Landed,
and soon possess themselves of the
Town,

Town, where several Houses blew up about their Ears, and as some of the Men received considerable Damage thereby, so was Captain Lauce very much scalded, and possibly this is the time Colonel Lillingston means, when the Sailers were Plundering the Country.

In Page 53, He alledges, That an Article in the 318th of my Memoirs, was either set down at Random, or upon very gross Information. The Words are these, The said Colonel thought it not proper to undertake this Affair, or for some other Reasons it was laid aside, and the Men stragled up and down the Country for Plunder, by which means several of them were lost. Now the Colonel does not (with Submission) rightly take the meaning of those Words, and possibly I have not left them so clear, as I will now endeavour to make them, by informing you that they Relate to the not Embarking the Forces on board the Squadron after the Action of Cape François, according as was agreed at a Council of War, in order to their being put on Shoar again at Port de Paix, and not to the very Action against that Fort, for it must certainly be allowed, that the
Colonel

Colonel was there with his Forces, that he Actually raised his Batteries, and Plied them against the Enemy. But by this I am naturally led to say somewhat more touching the Reason of not Embarking the Forces, as was agreed, and of the Motions that were afterwards made, the greatest part whereof will be found to agree with the Extracts of the Journals; and as they were not, I dare say, Calculated purposely to prejudice the Gentlemen of the Regiment, so do I not make use of them otherwise than to justify the Sea Officers, and my Self. The Service of *St. Domingo* being over, it fell under Debate, what was next to be done; and a Council of War being held on Shoar, where were present the Sea and Land Officers, and those of the *Spanish* Forces, it was agreed (after some Obstacles were removed) that *Port de Paix* should be attacked, and that Colonel *Lillingston* with his Regiment should Embark on board the Squadron and Transports, for their greater ease and Refreshment, lest otherwise they might not be so well able to proceed on Service. To this end (as it appears by a Letter from Captain *Butler*) an Instrument was drawn

drawn up, and that Instrument Sign'd by the Colonel, the Major his Brother, and all the Land Captains, as well as the Sea Officers, and those of the Spanish Forces. This being done, the Com-madore appointed Captain Butler to take all the Boats, and with them to Transport Colonel *Lillingston* and his Regiment on Board the Squadron, where-in he affirms he did Punctually perform his Part, for that the Boats were actually ready to receive them; but that, contrary to the Resolution of the Council of War, the Forces were marched over Rocks and Mountains, through a Thick Wood all the way to *Port de Paix*, and that without any tolerable Provision made for them, in a Country so barren as that is; inso-much that many of them were Starved and Drown'd: Nay, if I am not mis-informed, the Colonel did himself own they were forced to Swim over and ford many Rivers and Rivulets, and it is likewise said that the Streams carried several of them away, while others, who were not able to undergo the Fatigue, Perished by the way for want of help and Sustenance.

This is the Account which I find concerning the Regiment's not Em-barking,

barking, and of the ill Consequences which did attend so long and hazardous a March: And as Colonel *Lillingston* hath himself owned that it was both long and tedious, and that the Men, as well as Officers, were exposed to very great Hardships, so does he relate the Reasons of attempting it to be as follows.

He says, that the Men were resolved not to go on board the Squadron again, till bound to *Jamaica*; upon which, and the *Spanish* General's Desire that they might march together to *Port de Paix*, in order as well to Attack the Enemy in their great Fort, as for their greater Safety from the Additional Forces they had heard were got together in those Parts, he join'd the *Spanish* Army with 900 Men, acquainted the Commadore therewith, and desired him to sail with the Squadron to *Port de Paix*.

From hence I take the freedom to observe, That if it had been agreed before at a General Council of War, and that Agreement Sign'd to by the Sea as well as Land Officers, that the Forces should Embark, for their more speedy and safe conveyance to *Port de Paix*, it seems somewhat remote from

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Disci-

Discipline, to proceed contrary to such Solemn Resolutions, without calling another General Council of the proper Officers, where the Conveniencies, as well as Inconveniencies, might have been fairly debated and somewhat regularly determined.

But to proceed; The Colonel will not allow that when the Commadore arrived at *Port de Paix*, and landed with 400 Men, he did it in order to a Communication with the Land Forces, but says his Chief Design was to seize on a large Plantation about 4 Leagues from the Shore, where was a Gentleman's House well fortified, and from which they were obliged to retire, by Reason of the opposition that was made.

Now as Captain *Wilmot* does positively declare in his Letter, that he actually Landed to gain Communication with the Army; So can it not be thought he took wrong Measures, when he heard not of them, by endeavouring to dispoil the Enemy to the utmost of his Power.

But to return to Captain *Butler's* Account. This March of the Army, says he, was proposed to have been performed in three days, whereas it took

took up fifteen, (which the Colonel himself owns if I mistake not) and the Fleet got to the appointed Rendezvous in two; but not hearing of the Regiment, several days after (as the Extract of the Journals also mention) it was concluded that they were lost.

In the mean while the Commadore caus'd to be drawn out from the Squadron 400 Seamen, and form'd them into Companies, himself being Colonel, Captain *Hughes* Lieutenant-Colonel, and Captain *Butler* Major. With this Strength 'tis said they landed about 8 or 9 Miles from *Port de Paix*, whereon was mounted between 80 and 90 Guns, and that marching on (notwithstanding the Shot from the Fort gauled them when they approached within reach) they obliged the Enemy to set fire to the whole Town that was without the Castle, so that there was nothing left standing but the Church.

That the Army did give notice of their Approach, is not disputed; for it is agreed on all hands, that three days after the Sea Officers and their Men had done the beforementioned Service, Colonel *Lillingston* came within Sight, and that making then a Smoak in the Wood (which was the Signal agreed

upon) the Commadore ordered Captain *Hughes*, Captain *Sant*, and Captain *Butler*, to proceed with the Boats, well Arm'd, to the Place where the Smoak was, and there they met the Colonel, with but Part of his Regiment, and himself indisposed. Twas very natural for them to enquire after the remainder of the Forces, and I am inform'd, that when they had asked the Question several times, one of the Soldiers cried out in a Passion they were undone, for that many were Starved and Drown'd, and others crawling upon the way, in order to reach thither, if possible.

The Castle was now to be attempted, and consequently the Sea Officers and their Men had no little share in that Service, if what is related to me be Fact, namely, That the small Number of Soldiers in Health were hardly sufficient to drag up to the Platform their Guns, Mortar, and Carriages: And as the Colonel does himself own, that he sent to the Commadore for Men to assist him, so does my Author assure me, that the Captains in the Squadron were thereupon Summoned to a Council of War, and Debated what might be best done for the good of the

the Service in such an Exigence; but that reflecting on the Misfortunes which had already happen'd to the Soldiers, they judg'd it not reasonable to expose the Seamen; nor indeed do they themselves care to be Commanded by any other than their own proper Officers.

I shall say nothing to contradict the Account which the Colonel has given of his own Proceedings against the Fort of *Port de Paix*; nor will I so much as imagine that he did not do his utmost with the Forces he had under his Command, so soon as he had formed his Batteries, and got all things in readiness for the Attack. My chief Business is to inform you how the Sea-Officers, and the Men belonging to the Squadron, behaved themselves on this Occasion; but as I can say nothing of that neither, from my own Knowledge, so have I already quoted the Author from whom I have the Account, which is confirm'd not only by the Commodore's Letter, but by great numbers of the Sea-Officers Journals.

Captain *Wilmot* and his Officers thinking it not convenient to Joyn any of the Seamen with the Land-Forces, as I have before observed, a Detachment

of about 500 was drawn out from the Squadron, who landed and possess'd themselves of a Hill which over-looked the Garison, and (as 'tis said) was not above two Pistol-shot off, or at least so near as that they could Talk with the Enemy.

Upon this Hill they did, with great Labour, place 11 Pieces of Cannon, that were put on Shore from the Ships of War, and in 14 days time they fixed their Works and Platforms under the Cover of a Wood. Being in this readiness, they opened a Sight from their Guns, and by a continual Fire, for about 10 Days, beat down several Walls, and made a Breach through the Middle Tower; and in the Night-time they threw in Granado-Shells, which hindered the People from rest. 'Tis said, That in this Dispute several Officers and Men were lost, for that the Enemy plied them warmly; and that the Damage done to the *French*, was dismounting several of their Cannon, killing greatest part of their Cattle, and many of their People.

At 10 at Night a Negro was taken, who had Deserted the place, and gave an Account that the whole Garison was coming out, with a Design to betake them-

themselves to the Woods; for they judg'd, it seems, (and that rightly too) that our Men had not time to unite in an entire Body; but Captain *Hughes* being ready with his Company, Captain *Butler* with his, and Captain *Moses* (whose Guard-night it was) having with him several Men, they posted themselves so as to meet the Enemy at a Pass, while others fell in upon their Rear. It was very Dark, so that they fired on the Enemy but once, and then they betook themselves to their Heels. The Negro had given our Men the Word the *French* designed to make use of, which was *Bourneo*, insomuch, that all the *Bourneo's* who came within reach were cut off, and even some of those who made their Escape at this place, were met with in the Woods by the *Spaniards*, and there Slain.

Now, this (which is justified by the Journals of all the Officers in the Fleet) differs very much from the Account given by Colonel *Lillingston*. For he says in Page 104, *That the few Shot the Enemy made at the Seamens Battery presently demolished it, and rendred it uselefs, whereupon they sent for more Guns, and then they went on, though they never made any thing like a Breach: And then he goes*

on with a particular Account of the Attacks made by the Land-Forces till Page 113.

There he tells you, That in the Morning about Two of the Clock he heard a great Volley of Muskets fired on the side of the Fort next the Sea, and after that another followed, with confused Firing for about a quarter of an Hour, being as he thought, about the Quarter where Captain Wilmot and his Men carried on his Siege by himself; but that sending his Brother with some English and Spanish Forces to know the Cause thereof; when he came to the Seamen's Quarters he found them all in Confusion, and several of them kill'd.

He tells us further, That the Governor expecting a general Storm, and resolving not to Surrender upon Articles, had packt up all they could carry with them, and resolved to Sally with his whole Garrison, and Fight his way through, and easily perceiving the undisciplin'd, irregular Management of the Commadore and his Men, concluded to make an Attempt there.

That accordingly in the dead of the Night he fell in with the Main Guard of the Seamen, and coming very near them undiscover'd, poured in a Volley of Shot upon them, and having put them into Confusion

fusion enough, faced them till his whole Body, Men, Women, and Children, march'd off, without receiving any manner of Damage, except a few Men wounded, but no Body kill'd, except the Governor's Horse.

This is the Account which Colonel Lillingston gives, and although we have it from himself only, yet will I not brand it with so ill a Character, as he frequently makes use of, for that I think does little suit with the Character of an Author, or a Gentleman; and whatever it may do with others, it shall always weigh with me, That an Account writ with Decency, and without Spleen, carries with it the much fairer Face; but more especially when 'tis back'd by so many Vouchers, as the Journals of the Sea-Officers placed at the latter end of this Discourse.

The Action being over, Captain Butler and Captain Moser returned to the Castle, and taking Possession of it at 2 a Clock, hoisted a Jack-Flag of the King of England's on the Ensign-Staff, and placing the proper Centinels, they sent word to Colonel Lillingston of the Fort's being taken.

By what hath been said, it is more than probable that the Sea-Officers and

Sailors

Sailors run the greatest Hazzards; and as I am inform'd, (and the Papers referred to, make appear) almost all the former, as well as the Commadore, were wounded, and several of the Men slain: Whereas Colonel *Lillingston*, and the Spanish Forces, were exposed to no extraordinary Danger, more than from the Shot the Enemy made at them from their Fort; and as he himself informs us, he had the good Fortune to make his Batteries so very substantial, as that the Shot lodged themselves therein.

He has acquainted you what Services were perform'd by his Batteries against the Fort; that a Breach was made fit for an Assault, and that, in Order thereunto, all things were preparing. I neither can, nor shall I endeavour to contradict what may very reasonably be allowed to be Fact; but yet considering the nature of their Guns, and that the Sea-Officers had mounted many more from their Ships, may it not be believed that they, as well as the Land-Forces, were instrumental in bringing the Enemy to that Extremity, which forced them to leave their Fort, and to Fight their way thorough, as is before related?

Had

Had I had any design, when I writ my *Memoirs*, to Reflect on Colonel *Lillingston*, I might with little difficulty have come at the Materials I now make use of in my own Justification, for they were all, or at least the greatest part, then within my reach: And since he has inserted in his Book whatever he judged material, as to his own particular; so may I on the very same Score, be admitted to place in mine the following Extract of a Letter from Captain *Butler*, which was dated on Board the *Dunkirk* at *Spithead*, the 5th of December, 1695. and directed to the then Lords of the Admiralty.

“ Commadore *Wilmot*, after the Action at *Port de Paix*, gave me a Memorial as a Token of his Friendship for what I had done, and promised me to come into the *Winchester*, and that he would give me the *Dunkirk*; and lastly, That he would recommend me to your Lordships. He gave me a Commission for Major of the Regiment of Marines, and Captain *Hughes* one for Lieutenant Colonel, and with what Men we had we fell upon above 600 of the Enemy at Midnight, making their Escape from the Garrison. The

" The Engagement was smart, but not
 " long; we drove them into the Jaws
 " of about 300 Launcers, which Com-
 " madore *Wilmot* had caus'd to be
 " placed some time before in a Wood,
 " so there fell between us upward of
 " 400 of them. To do Captain *Hughes*
 " right, I must truly say, he behaved him-
 " self very bravely, and order'd things
 " to the best Advantage. Commadore
 " *Wilmot* came to our Relief with 300
 " Men more, but we being joyn'd close
 " to the Enemy, he could do nothing
 " it was so Dark, least he should Da-
 " mage his Friends. After this Heat
 " was over, the Commadore desired
 " me with 28 Men, which he allowed
 " me, to observe what might be done
 " upon the Garison, and when I had
 " so done, I sent him word in less
 " than two Hours, that I had hoisted
 " the King of England's Colours upon
 " the Tower, in the midst of the said
 " Garison of *Port de Paix*. Captain
 " *Hughes* was wounded in one of his
 " Arms, and my self in the Right Arm
 " and Head. Our loss was inconfide-
 " rable. There is a great deal due to the Me-
 " mory of Captain *Wilmot*, who very
 " zealously order'd, and did all things to
 " the best Advantage.

Be-

Besides this, I have other Letters by me; but as they may be more properly shewn to those whose Curiosity shall lead them thereunto, than inserted here, so would they swell this Discourse to too great a Bulk. Wherefore I will proceed to the 118th Page of the Colonel's Book, where he says thus, *We took in this Fort, (meaning Port de Paix) and at Cape François, 133 Pieces of Cannon, whereof several were Brass, and the Iron were some of them the best that ever I saw. The Guns, Ammunition, and what was not portable by the Seamen, were stored among the Spaniards and us; and the very Stores of Sails, Cordage, Powder, and Ball, which remain'd for our Parts, were not worth less than 1500 l.*

Now says he, *I should have thought it a particular piece of Justice to the Nation, if Mr. Burchet would have told us in his History, how many of these great Guns, and how much of these Stores were deliver'd by the Commadore, or his Survivors, into his Majesty's Stores either at home, or at Jamaica.*

This is indeed a Task too difficult for me: But why may I not return the Question to Colonel Lillingston, and demand

demand of him, What Account he has given of those that fell to the Share of himself, Officers, and Men? For I suppose the *Spanish* General took care of those which came to his Lot. Nor is it reasonable to think that the Commadore did, after they were left on the Forts, because the Seamen could not conveniently carry them off, attempt a second time to make himself Master of them; or that if he had, the Officers and Soldiers would have tamely parted with them. Possibly some of the Guns taken from the Enemy were carried on Board the Squadron, because Captain *Butler* gives an Account, that when he took Possession of the *Dunkirk*, upon the Death of Captain *Wilmot*, he found on Board four Brass Guns, one Iron one, and four Pattereroes, which, at his return to *Chatham*, he deliver'd into the Stores there, and had a Receipt for them: And as I am not able to Answer, whether or not the others were deliver'd into the Stores at *Jamaica*, or here; so can I not say, but that Colonel *Lillingston* may have fairly acquitted himself of those which were shared among him and his Officers; for I think his Majesty did, by his Instructions, reserve all those things to the Publick Use.

It

It is observed in Page 129, That the Commadore had some Apprehensions of being called to an Account when he arrived in England, and that therefore when he understood Colonel Lillingston was so very bad, as that there was small hopes of his Life, he sent three of his Captains to him with Papers to Sign; but that notwithstanding great Persuasions he refused, and at last, raising his Head, told them, That he wondred they could expect he should Sign to their Villanous Actions at his going out of the World.

Now as the Colonel assures us that Captain Butler, Captain Fletcher, and Captain Moses, were the three Gentlemen sent to him on this Message, so does the former aver, that he was Sick in Bed of a Fever and Flux at the time 'tis said this was done, and that he continued so three Months after. But supposing any of the other Gentlemen had brought Papers to the Colonel, how is it possible that he could Divine their Contents were Villanous? For he owns that he knew nothing of them, and would fain have seen them after he recovered.

In Page 131, The Colonel is pleased to inveigh against Captain Butler, after he has told you, That the Justice of
Pro-

Providence overlook their wretched doings,
and that not many of the Authors of all
the Disorders Liv'd to enjoy the Fruits of
their Rapine and Theft. It seems not a
 little strange to me, that he should
 imagine these Gentlemen were taken
 out of the World purely upon the
 Score of their having spoiled the Ene-
 my all that was in their Power; a thing
 that, as I have said before, they were
 Principally sent abroad for; nor can
 their having got somewhat thereby be
 reasonably termed Thievery: Had they
 indeed minded nothing but their own
 advantage, as the Colonel says the
 Commadore told him he would Prin-
 cipally do: Had they only burnt
 Plantations, and rob'd Houses, and
 left the Enemy Masters of their Forts
 when they came away, they had then
 deserved as much Punishment, as, on
 the contrary, they do Commendation:
 And if Death was the Punishment for
 ill Actions, and it came not from Natural
 Causes, were there not many Gentle-
 men of Colonel *Lillingston's* Regiment
 who Died also, Particularly his own
 Brother? But far be it from me to
 say they ceased to be, because they
 injur'd the Enemy while in being. No,
 it seems rather strange to me that so
 many

many came home alive, considering that violent Distemper which seized them soon after their leaving *Jamaica*, for I am very credibly inform'd, the living were hardly sufficient to put the Dead overboard.

But to the Particular Business of Captain *Butler*. I do well remember when he return'd from this Expedition, there were some People, three I think, who belonged to the *Dunkirk*, that informed the Widow of Captain *Wilmot* the Commadore, Captain *Butler* had in his hands very great Effects of her deceased Husband's; whereupon I means were sought to Arrest him in *January* 1698, even when he was come to Town from his Ship in the River *Medway*, in order to attend a Committee of the Honourable House of Commons, appointed to examine into this Matter, and thereupon he writ the following Letter viz.

I should have daily attended the Board, but that this vexatious Woman, and her worse Solicitor Mr. *Buxton*, are using their best endeavours to Arrest me, thereby to prevent my appearing before the Committee on Monday next, before whom I doubt not but to let the World know how
F 'innocent

innocent I am in that Matter, but at present do keep out of their way ; but right or wrong they resolve, as they Report, to turn me out of my Employment. I cannot tell what the World will come to, nor do I wonder at the greatness of their Malice against me (which truly proceeds from my Punishing them for setting the Ship on Fire, meaning those who Swore against him) since they dare to use such irreverent Language against their Lordships.

With this Letter he sent the Affidavit hereafter mention'd,

All the Officers of his Majesty's Ship the Dunkirk make Oath, That they well know Theophilus Buxton, who Acted as Steward of the said Ship, which Theophilus Buxton, during such his Employment, was a Person guilty of frequent Drunkenness, abominable Profaneness, execrable Oaths, Blasphemy, Thievery and Embezelment. And the said Buxton, and John Heath, having, in one of their Drunken Fits at Sea, set a Candle on a Jarr of Oil in the Steward-Room, next to the Powder-Room, by which means the Oil took Fire, the said Ship, with all that was in her, had in all
pro-

probability been burnt or blown up, had not the Second Lieutenant of the Ship, with much difficulty and hazard, put out the Fire; for which offence the said Buxton, and John Heath, had about 40 Lashes apiece given them by Order of Captain Thomas Butler, then Commander of the said Ship; and after the said Buxton came into Harbour, he ran away from the said Ship. And these Deponents further say, that they likewise well know John Brinley, Mariner in the said Ship Dunkirk, who was a Person very negligent of his Duty, and very seditious, and at Portsmouth threatened his said Captain, and to kill one of the Lieutenants of the said Ship, and attempted to head the Ship's Company in an open Mutiny. And these Deponents verily believe, that the said Buxton, Heath, and Brinley, are such Profligate Persons, that they will swear any thing that their Malice and desire of Revenge can Dictate to them.

Robert Stiles, First Lieutenant.

John Jarman, Second Lieutenant.

William Johnson, Master.

John Wogan, Master's Mate.

Richard Prince, Midshipman.

Robert Gregory, Coxmain.

Richard Mills, }

John Budding, }

Boatswains Mates.

Besides, as this Affair was about 7 years since examined into by a Committee of the Honourable House of Commons, purposely appointed; so may it appear by the following Copy of Mrs. *Wilmot's* Letter to Captain *Butler* (which I suppose she may well remember) that she was then well satisfied with him, as to the Effects of her deceased Husband, however she may have been since induced to enter into long and tedious Law-suits, almost to the ruine of them both.

Copy of Mrs. *Wilmot's* Letter
to Captain *Butler*, Dated
February 20, 169⁶/₇.

Worthy Sir,

I Am much obliged to the Account my Sister *Crawford* gives me of the favour you were pleased to promise her, so far as to appear with me when I come to face my Antagonist. I had a Broadside of *Madam Rhoades* yesterday, and promised her a Meeting at the Coffeehouse where the Cabal is, but limited no time till I had heard from you. Sir, I confide so far in your Honour, that I refer my Matter wholly

wholly to your Consideration in this dubious Case, wherein I make you Arbitrator. If you please to take the trouble upon you, I shall ever acknowledge it as a great Favour added to those I have already receiv'd. I am now at a Non-plus how to express my Sentiments of your Goodness, being unable to retaliate any Part at present, but by my Prayers and grateful Thanks. Sir, if I outlive my Trouble, I shall let the World know what Obligations you have laid on me. Pray name the time and place, and pardon this from

Honoured Sir,

Your humble Servant,

Ruth Wilmot.

It may be likewise observed, That after Captain Butler had delivered to Mrs. Wilmot all her Husband's Effects, in Plate, Money, Indico, Sugar, Cocoe, &c. She voluntarily went with him to an Attorney, and all three of them to one of his Majesty's Justices of the Peace, before whom Captain Butler made Affidavit, that he had delivered to her all her Husband's Effects, and that he did verily believe she could not

be damaged more than 20 *l.* upon Account of Fresh Meats and Wines, that her Husband had on Board before he succeeded him in the *Dunkirk*; upon which Mrs. *Wilmot* gave him a General Release.

And more than this, Captain *Butler's* Council is able (if I am rightly informed) to satisfy the World that the Law has acquitted him from all Demands of this nature; and that there is not at this time any thing more depending between him and Mrs. *Wilmot* than 48 *l.*, which does in no wise relate to the Plunder. And, as he says, he has already offered it more than once, and I do verily believe he now will readily (and that like a good Christian) take the holy Sacrament, that he was not, on any Account whatever, more than 300 *l.* the richer, by that great All which 'tis said he got during the Expedition, besides the Pay of himself and Servants, for the time he Commanded the *Winchester*, and after her the *Dunkirk*. And I have accidentally had an Account from his Correspondent, who was privy to all his Affairs, and into whose Hands his Effects came, that all he brought home, which he could properly call his own, was under that Summ.

It seems strange to me, and possibly it will appear so to others, That if Captain *Wilmot* had amassed Riches to himself, so vastly disproportionable to what fell to the Share of the Captains in the Squadron under his Command, and that Captain *Butler* did at his Death make himself Master thereof, those Captains, or their Executors, as well as Captain *Wilmot's* Widow, did not put in their Claim to a Proportion of it, according to the Distribution of the Booty which was settled by his Majesty; for they had undoubtedly as just a Pretence, and I cannot think they would have set down quietly under such Injuries, were they truly sensible of their having been done to them.

In several other Pages of Colonel *Lillingston's* Book, are inserted many Affidavits made by his Officers before Sir *William Beeston*, then Lieutenant Governor of *Jamaica*, which set forth the Services perform'd by the Land-Forces, and the Hardships and Interruptions they met with from the Commadore, and the Sea-Officers, during the whole Expedition; and indeed those Affidavits are a Summary Account of his whole Book, or at least, the one does seem to agree with the other.

I shall be very far from affirming, That there was not such Affidavits made before Sir *William Beeston*; for the Colonel says, that he actually witnessed them; nor shall I reflect on the Validity of them, since Gentlemen, who had the Honour to bear his Majesty's Commission (or at least some of them) have given them a Sanction: But this I must take leave to observe, That all these Affidavits being made before the Lieutenant Governor of *Jamaica*, if he had thought them of any extraordinary Moment, it is to me next to a Wonder, that he did not thereupon transmit home Complaints against Captain *Wilmot*, and the Officers of the Squadron, in regard he was not only Governor of the Island, but Lieutenant, or, more properly speaking, Vice-Admiral in those Parts to the Lord-High-Admiral: Nor does there want numerous Instances in this Office, of his having represented the Failures and Disorders of Sea-Commanders, even in things of much less Consequence than this is represented to be, however he came in this particular Case to omit doing thereof.

But since I have been at the trouble of Answering the most material Articles in the foregoing Part of Colonel *Lillingston's*

Lillingston's Book, I think it also necessary to make some Observations on the Depositions themselves, which begin in the 139 Page.

Interrogatory I.

If the Second night after Colonel *Lillingston* landed with his Regiment, near *Cape François*, the *French* did not blow up their Magazine, set some Houses on Fire, and so quit the Town, having five Miles to march the same way that we and the *Spaniards* marched the next day to the Town and Fort?

Observation.

The Truth of this is not disputed : But were not the Sea Officers and their Men as much concern'd in obliging the Enemy to do it? For Confirmation whereof I refer to the Extracts of the several Journals, as well as the Com-madore's, and Captain *Butler's* Letters.

Interrogatory II.

If the Seamen had not Plundered, and taken all things that were to be got in the Town, and retired all on board before the Army could get thither;

ther; so that when the *Spaniards* and Colonel *Lillingston's* Regiment came into the Town, they found the Place Plundered, and nothing left for them, which Plunder could not be less worth than 3000 *l*, and the Commadore refused to give us any part of the same; which dissatisfied the *Spaniards*, and made Colonel *Lillingston's* Men ready to Mutiny, seeing that all the Plunder was gotten by the Seamen?

Observation.

I cannot Answer for it (as I have already observed) that the Seamen had a very nice Regard to the Distribution of the Plunder, especially when they were Masters thereof before the Land Forces came up: Nor is it mention'd in this Article, what the said Land Forces did towards obliging the Enemy to retire and leave the said Booty. I believe that the *Spaniards*, as well as our Officers and Soldiers were dissatisfied if they had no share of it: But on the other hand the Commadore gives an Account, that the Soldiers were so far from being behind hand in this Particular, they they took from the Seamen they met with, not only what they had got, but even so much as Greens
and

and other things proper for nourishment.

Interrogatory III.

If the Commadore did not refuse to hold a Council of War on Shoar?

Observation.

It is not said where, and for what Service; but it may be well remembered, that Twelve days were spent before any thing was done, by the Governor of *St. Domingo's* refusing the Commadore's sitting at Councils of War on Shoar.

Interrogatory IV.

If Captain *Leather* and Lieutenant *Cunningham*, who were ordered by Colonel *Lillingston* to march in the Van of the *Spaniards*, with a Party of the Colonel's Regiment, at their coming to the Fort at *Cape François*, found any Guard left by the Commadore at the Plag, except one Seamen, with his Sword in his hand, by the Flag?

Observation.

It is conceiv'd that there was no great Occasion for a Guard, for the Colonel himself declares that the Sea-Officers, and
their

their Men, had Plundered the Town and Fort; and they themselves say that they kept Possession of it till two the next day, when the Land Forces marched into it; nor is it reasonable to believe that the Enemy, who were frightened out of it, would so soon take Courage and return again, especially when the Land Forces were so near at hand.

Interrogatory V.

If it is not known to Captain *Manjoy*, Captain *Green* and Lieutenant *Tutchin*, that the *Spaniards*, when they quartered in the Country, and Colonel *Lillingston* in *Cape François*, did not send to the Colonel to acquaint him that Captain *Laurence de Grave* (who was Lieutenant Governor of the Cape) was marched towards *Manchaneel - Bay*, where the *Spaniards* had left part of their Provisions and Bagage, and that they had sent a considerable Party of Men that way, and did desire that Colonel *Lillingston* would march as many more as he could spare to send them?

Observation.

Observation.

Possibly many more of the Officers of the Regiment might know of this Message to the Colonel, as well as the three Gentlemen beforemention'd: But the question is, whether the Colonel himself was not then sensible it had been agreed at a General Council of War, he should embark his Men on board the Squadron and Transport Ships, for *Port de Paix*, and whether that Agreement was not Sign'd by himself and all the Sea and Land Officers? The Inconveniencies which attended the not doing it I have before taken notice of, and I do not find that any Number of the Enemy's Men were met with in the 15 days March towards *Port de Paix*.

Interrogatory VI.

If it is known to Captain *Manjoy*, Captain *Green*, and Lieutenant *Tutchin*, that Colonel *Lillingston*, Captain *Manjoy* and Captain *Green*, being all that Commanded Companies then at *Cape François*, after the Resolution of joining the *Spaniards*, according to their Request, did write a Letter to the *Commodore*, Signed by the Colonel, and the

the two said Captains, desiring him that he would leave two or three of the Merchant Men, and a Frigate, some days at the Cape, that if we should meet with any stop, or that we should find any Sick Men with the 200 that were with Major Lillingston, having before join'd the Spaniards, we might not want their Assistance in case of a Retreat, or the conveniency of putting our Sick Men on board, in case necessity required?

Observation

There is no doubt made of the Colonel's dispatching such a Letter to the Commadore, and though it was not directly sent to him, yet possibly it might be delivered to him by the Commissary, Mr. Murray, as is alledged. But as the Commadore's Answer thereunto is not inserted, so does it seem to me that by not complying with what the Colonel desired of him, he shew'd a very great dislike to the intended March, and that he was not without Apprehensions of the ill Consequences that might attend it.

Inter-

Interrogatory VII.

If when we came where the Major quartered, we did not find 30 Sick Men or thereabouts? Which we sent back the next day after leaving the Cape; but the Commadore was sailed with the whole Fleet, not leaving one Ship behind.

Observation.

It shews, That the Commadore was sensible how necessary 'twas to push the Service with his own Officers and Men; nor were they idle in the fourteen Days they arrived at *Pott de Paix* before the Land-Forces, as his Letter, and several Journals shew. Besides, he was undoubtedly the best Judge, whether 'twas proper to leave any Ships behind or not; for as those Seas were far from being free from *French Privateers*, so were the Masters of the Merchant Ships very disorderly, and possibly would have gone directly to *Jamaica*, when there was nothing to restrain them; whereas the Squadron, when together, protected all, and prevented such Disorders.

Interroga-

Interrogatory VIII.

If all the Officers present do not know, that the Commadore would not allow Collonel *Lillingston* either a Barge, Pinnace or Yaul, to attend his Orders the whole Siege of *Port de Paix*?

Observation.

I cannot well foresee how Boats could be spared from the Squadron, when they were, generally speaking, employ'd in Action against that place; but possibly the Colonel and his Officers could not want such a Convenience from the several Transports and Storeships, when they had occasion for the same.

Interrogatory IX.

If Captain *Leathes* doth not know, that had not the Spanish Admiral taken in those Men we sent back at *François*, and brought them up to the Fleet, and put them on Board the Ship Captain *Leathes* was in, the Men had not been left behind?

Observation.

This was a good natured thing of the Spanish Admiral; and possibly Captain *Wilmot* knowing that he did intend
to

to stay for the *Spanish* Forces, and the Men which Major *Lillingston* had with them, he did not think it necessary to leave any other Ships to take them in.

Interrogatory X.

If when Major *Lillingston* went first into the Fort at *Port de Paix*, with between 2 and 300 Men before day, there were any of the Sea-Officers in the Fort or Castle, with any Body of Men, except about 14 or 16 straggling Sea-men, and if there were not some of the Sea-Officers and Men standing without, and durst not enter in, for fear of blowing up?

Observation.

After the Sea-Officers and their Men had encountred the Flying Garison, as is before related, Captain *Butler* and Captain *Moses*, with a Party of their Men, found the Breach the Enemy came out at, and entring the Fortress soon after One a Clock, advanced to the middle Tower or Castle, wherein the Governor dwelt, and were inform'd by a few impotent People, that the Garison was entirely Deserted; and those poore Wretches pray'd for Quarter, and that they might be protected from

the *Spaniards*, for they very much dreaded them. After this, there were Centinels plac'd (as I am inform'd) at the Breaches which could be found in the Night, to prevent the Enemies return, while the rest of the Officers and Men remain'd in a Body. The Jack-Flag was about this time hoisted; and Captain *Butler* says he sent a Serjeant to Colonel *Lillingston* at his Camp, and another to the Commadore, to acquaint them that they had Possession of the Fort. By the Serjeant sent to the Commadore, he dispatched a File of Musquetiers, and a *French* Prisoner, who had informed him of some Trains laid by the Enemy; nor were they without Grounds to believe it, since the like was done at *Port François*. It was the Command of the Commadore, that all the Men should be drawn out of the Fortress, to prevent the Mischief that might have otherwise happened, and that they should be conveniently posted under the Walls; and he sent them word that he would himself suddenly reinforce them. However, it was thought convenient that the Serjeant, the File of Musquetiers, and the Prisoner, should be sent into the Fort, that, by the Guidance of the latter, the Matches

Matches to the Trains might be secured. 'Tis said, That Ensign *Jenkins* (who, if I mistake not, was one of Colonel *Lillingston's* Officers, or at least had been so) desired to be at the Head of this Service; which was granted; and that he, like a good Officer, soon effected it, and brought away, and delivered the Matches to Captain *Butler*: Whereupon the Sea-Officers and Men marched into the Garison again, about Three a Clock, and placed the Centinels at the Breaches, as before. About this time (as it is related by Captain *Butler*) Major *Lillingston* came to them some other way, with not above 100 Land-Soldiers; and possibly he might not find the Sea-Officers and their Men actually in the Fort; but it was from the Reasons beforemention'd, as Colonel *Lillingston* himself observes, and not from any Apprehensions they had of the Enemy.

Interrogatory XI.

If Major *Lillingston* was not in the Fort, before the Commadore came with his Men?

Observation.

This is not disputed: For the preceding Answer tells you, That Captain *Butler* and Captain *Moses* had made themselves Masters of it, and that then they received Orders from the Commadore to place themselves under the Walls for fear of being blown up, with notice that he would suddenly reinforce them; and 'tis probable that Major *Lillingston* did arrive in the mean time.

Interrogatory XII.

If the Commadore did not clap Major *Lillingston* on the Shoulder at meeting, saying, *Major, I am now stronger than you*; and so his Men fell to plundering the Castle, only one Chamber which he ordered Captain *Hughes* to Lock, and set a Guard upon; and when Colonel *Lillingston* came into the Fort, the Commadore soon went on Board; and although the Colonel commanded Captain *Hughes* to open the Chamber, and shew the Major what was in it, he said he would not do it without the Commadore's Order; so that neither Officer nor Seamen were to be Commanded.

Observation.

Observation.

Captain *Hughes*, were he within reach, and Captain *Wilmot*, were he alive, could give a better Answer to this, than I can pretend to do, But as it is not mention'd in the Affidavit, what became of the Goods or Booty in the lockt-up Room; so cannot I think Captain *Hughes* was in the wrong, when he refused to obey the Orders of the Colonel, (who had nothing to do to Command him) especially when they were directly contrary to those he had received from his proper Superior Officer. And as to the Commadore's clapping Major *Lillingston* on the Shoulder, and telling him that he was strongest, I cannot imagine what can be inferred therefrom: But Captain *Butler* says, That he was all the while present with those two Gentlemen, and that there did not any thing pass between them, but what was extraordinary Civil.

Interrogatory XIII.

IF Major *Conningsby*, Lieutenant *Foulk*, Lieutenant *Tutchin*, and several more of the Officers, do not know that when Colonel *Lillingston* ordered the Cannon on Shoar, he had the four first

Pieces sent without Linch-pins, and a wrong Carriage to one of the Cannon, pretending the Pins could not be found; so made the Colonel wait for some days for them?

Observation.

This did in no wise concern the Commadore: For as the Cannon, Mortars, and all things necessary for them, were (as 'tis to be supposed) on Board the Transport Ships employed by the Office of Ordnance; so were their Officers, and they only, answerable for any Mis-carriage of this nature.

Interrogatory XIV.

If when the Colonel ordered a Mortar on Shoar, there was not a wrong Bed sent, which also caused some Days Delay?

Observation

The foregoing may sufficiently Answer this: And the Commadore had nothing more to do with it, than the assisting with his Boats in the Landing them.

Interrogatory XV.

If we were not without any Boat, some-

Sometimes two or three days together, whatever urgent Occasion we had for one? And Lieutenant *Foulk* and Lieutenant *Cunningham* were forced to go round for a Boat.

Observation.

This was somewhat hard, if the Squadron could spare them, which possibly could not be done at all times: But, as I have said before, it was somewhat strange that Boats should be wanting from the Storeships and Transports for the Conveniency of the Land-Officers.

Interrogatory XVI.

If the Commissary ever came into the Camp when he lay near the Town, during the time of the Siege; but did before desire, that the Colonel would give him a general Order to deliver to Captain *Lilly* whatever he should stand in need of; which, to prevent Delays, the Colonel did, and after, when the Commissary was on Board the Ships, he would not take notice of Captain *Lilly's* Orders, except in what pleas'd himself, which was likewise a delaying of time?

Observation.

Care ought to have been taken to have sent out a better Officer; or at least, it should have been in the Power of Colonel *Lillingston* to have suspended him, if he found that he had failed in the Performance of his Duty, and to have appointed another to Act in his room.

Interrogatory XVII

If Captain *Lilly*, chief Engenier, and the Gunners, or any belonging to the Train, are not of Opinion, That the Battery raised by the Seamen was of no Consequence, or any Assistance to us; and that, when it was first made, the Shot went through, and killed and wounded several of their Officers and Men; and though, if they had made a Breach, it was in such a place, that they could not make any Attack, and several of their Shot missed both the Fort and Castle, and came to our Camp?

Observation.

As I shall not Reflect on the Judgment of the Engenier, or the Gunners, in relation to Batteries, so do I not believe

lieve that the Sea-Officers are the best Art's Masters in those Affairs. However, it is apparent from all the Papers which I have refer'd unto, that their Guns did great Execution on the Fort, and that (notwithstanding some of their Shot mist, and might fly over the Fortrefs into Colonel *Lillingston's* Camp) they first made themselves Masters of it.

There was another Deposition made before Sir *William Beeston*, setting forth the Care, Diligence, and good Management of Colonel *Lillingston*, in Relation to the whole Expedition, and his Endeavours to further his Majesty's Service, and the Designs against the Enemy; and this is Sworn to by six Gentlemen who were under his Command. I shall not say, That himself and Officers did not do their Parts; but this, as well as the other Depositions, leads me to observe, That if the Colonel had not some Suspicion of a Contest between himself and the Commadore, and the Sea-Officers, when he came to *England*, he would not, in my poor Opinion, have been at the trouble to furnish himself with so many Testimonials. Whereas I do not find Captain
Wilmot

Wilmot took any such Care; but that, on the contrary, he only transmitted home a bare Account of his Voyage, and consequently referred himself to a thorough Examination, had his Proceedings been called in Question, and he so fortunate as to have reached *England*. Besides there was the very same prospect of the Death of the Officers under his Command, as there was of those in the Land-Service; so that in all probability they would have been upon an equal Foot in that particular, as to Witnesses. And Colonel *Lillingston* has no reason to take it amiss if I cannot be of Opinion, That all the Depositions before recited tend but very little towards lessening the Services perform'd by the Commadore, his Officers and Men, during the whole Expedition.

Another Affidavit in Page 146, declares; That the Commadore took a Piece of Stuff from the Corporal of Captain *Manjoy's* Company, at the Fort of *Port de Paix*; and that upon the Serjeant's desiring him not to do it, the Commadore asking who he was, and being inform'd, replied, *Shoot the Dog*. This is attested by the said Serjeant and Corporal; but if I understand *English*,
it

it is own'd in this very Affidavit, That neither the Serjeant or Corporal knew the Commadore, and yet it is positively Sworn it was he.

The next and last of the whole Number of the *Interrogatories* is this. If it is not known to the Officers in general, That although Colonel *Lillingston* desired and required the Assistance of the Commadore, according to his Majesty's Instructions, he not only refused to Assist us in getting off Guns and Mortars, but during the whole time of our Proceedings, acted by himself separate from us?

Observation.

The Deposition does not mention what those Guns and Mortars were, which the Commadore refused Assistance in the getting off. If those of the Train, which were sent from the Office of Ordnance for the Expedition, certainly it was the business of the Officers of the Train, to have taken care of this Service, and 'tis judged that there were Boats and Men belonging to the Transport Ships to have assisted the Soldiers in doing it. But if there was not such Transport Ships (which I am inclined

inclined to believe there was) then was the Commadore to blame if he did not give them Assistance, since it was for the Publick Good: Nay I think he ought to have done it, even though other Provision could have been made, provided he judged it might not have been prejudicial to the Ships, Boats, and Men: Nay, that the Boats of the Squadron were frequently employed, both in the putting on Shoar, and bringing off again the Guns and Mortars, I find by the Journals of most of the Officers concern'd in the Expedition. And as for the Commadore's acting separately with his Officers and Men, 'tis likely that he and they, upon debating the matter, judged they might be capable of doing better Service than by joining the Land Forces: And what they did has been already mention'd in several Places of this Book, and confirm'd by the Extracts of the aforementioned Journals.

Colonel Lillingston says, at the end of the Depositions, That Sir William Beefton (before whom they were taken) began plainly to discover the foul Play that had been shewn them, and that he was willing His Majesty should see how ill he had been treated by his Officers, whom he trusted on such important Affairs.

I have

I have already observed, and must do it a second time, That if Sir *William Beeston* had been sensible that His Majesty had been thus ill Served by his Sea Officers, he would certainly have represented it very strongly against them to the Lords of the Admiralty; Whereas I cannot, upon a very strict Search, find so much as one Paper in this Office relating thereunto, whatever there may be in others; and if there are any such in being, I doubt not but the Colonel might have furnished himself with Copies of them to have inserted in his Book. But I shall dwell no longer on this Subject, than in making this short Remark, That these Affidavits were not made before Sir *William Beeston* before the 16th of *August* 1695; and the Commadore (who arrived 23 days before) being obliged to sail for *England*, made the Signal so to do the 24th of *August*, tho he was prevented some days by Calms; nor do I find that the Governor demanded his Answers to any of those Affidavits, or that he knew any thing of them.

The Colonel continued very weak (as he informs you) all the Month of *August* and *September*, at *Jamaica*, and says

says, that during that time the Commadore was selling his ill-gotten Goods, and vesting the Effects in Merchandizes for *England*, and taking in Goods privately on the back of the Island.

To this I pray leave to observe, That had Colonel *Lillingston*, or any of the Officers of his Regiment in his Sickness, represented to the Lieutenant-Governor of *Jamaica* (whose Orders both Sea and Land Officers were directed by their Instructions to follow) that the Commadore had injured them in their allotted Share of the Plunder, it would either have been in his single Power, or at least he might have summoned a Council of War, and have obliged the Sea Officers, (in a very great measure, at least) to have complied with His Majesty's Distribution; but I do not find that any Application was made to him on that Score during the Commadore's stay on the Island.

And as to Captain *Wilmot's* taking in Goods privately on the back of the Island, the Gentlemen who were then Commissioners of His Majesty's Customs best know whether any were brought to *England* in his Ship or the others; for I think they touched no where till they

they arrived here: And sure I am, that it was then, and now is, the positive Orders of the Lord High Admiral to the Captains of all Ships of War, not to take in or transport any Merchandizes whatever, Gold, Silver or Jewels only excepted. 'Tis probable that all, or most of them, did take in Silver for England on the Merchant's Account, for that is allowable, and even what the *Winchester* had on board when lost on the Shoals of *Florida* was preserved, and safely brought home, but little or nothing else.

Although I have more than once already mention'd the march of our Forces to *Port de Paix*, in Company with the *Spaniards*, yet Colonel *Lillingston* having repeated it in Page 148, and aver'd that the Land Expedition had been at an end had he not done it, because the *Spaniards* did neither suppose themselves to be, or were strong enough to have gone by themselves; I can do no less than observe, (as I have done before) That he has not been pleas'd to let us know, in any part of his Book, what other interruptions they met with in the whole Sixteen days March, than Rivers that were to be Forded and Swam, and
extream

extream wants and hardships. I will not pretend to say that he was otherwise in the wrong, as to this March with the Spaniards, than that it was (as I am informed) contrary to the determined Opinion of a General Council of War; but I do rather hold the Spaniards blamable, if they assured him it might be done in so few days, when it actually took them up so many. This does certainly very much differ from the fair dealing he says he met at *Cape François*, and in my poor Opinion they either knew little or nothing of the Country; or if they were well acquainted with it, they did ill by leading our Troops into an Inconvenience, which might have been of greatest ill consequence to the intended Service. And as it sometimes happens that the greatest Masters in Figures mistake in numbers; so does Colonel *Lillingston's* Account, and that of the Sea Commanders, differ extreamly as to the number of Men that were lost in this tedious March.

I shall mention nothing here (although the Colonel has repeated it) touching the Effects of Captain *Wilmot*, on which he says he is inform'd Captain *Butler* seized at is Death; for I have

have already given an Account of that. But as to the loss of the *Winchester*, I must take up a little of your time, and my own, to relate the Circumstances of that Matter: And as it appears by the Papers in my Custody, it was as follows, viz.

This Ship was unfortunately lost in her Passage home, upon one of the Shoals, near three Miles from the *Florida-Shoar*; when Commanded by Captain *Soul*, who died soon after; and (as 'tis represented to me) there were not more then Ten Men who had Health enough to enable them to walk on the Deck. These poor Wretches had been all lost, had it not been for a Brigantine in Company of the Squadron, which Captain *Butler* Commanded to him. He was at this time very Sick and Weak; but yet caused himself to be conveyed from his Ship into the Vessel, and with great difficulty bore down to the Wreck; and saved the Men; but they were no sooner got clear of her, than they had like to have suffered the same Fate on the Reef of Rocks whereon the Ship sat full of Water. When he had got some distance from her, he discovered the Jack-Flag to be spread, the which was done by one Man, who had made too

WOM

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free

with the strong Liquours on Board, and by that means was not to be found when the others were preserved; but there was no possibility of going back to relieve him, for the Night was come on, and the Ships lay too near the Shoals, with the Wind at N. N. E.

Moreover, the loss of this Ship, *Winchester*, was solemnly examin'd into (as is usual) at a Court-Martial, held on Board the *Britannia*, in the River Medway, the 22d of February, 1692. where were present the Lord Berkeley, Sir Cloudesly Shovel, and Mr. Aylmer, Flag-Officers of the Fleet, and 21 Captains; who found, upon a thorough Examination, That she was actually lost for want of Hands to work her: For it was proved in Court, That there were not above 10 healthy Men on Board; and Mr. John Hesket, then her first Lieutenant, declared, That when Captain Butler (who Commanded in Chief) made the Signal for going about, upon seeing the Danger off of Cape Florida, they had but eight Men on the Deck, besides him the said Lieutenant, and the Master; and that all the rest were not in a Condition for Service.

Now,

Now, as I can never be of Opinion, whatever Notions others may have, that any Men, but more especially Gentlemen, who had the Honour to bear Commands, could be such intollerable Villains, as to design, or suffer, the loss of this Ship, purposely to Colour (as is alledged) many things which were said to be in her, though otherwise disposed of; so does it plainly appear by the Accounts from the Officers of the rest of the Ships, That none of them were so well Mann'd, as to be able to come safely home without the immediate Assistance of Providence. And so far was Captain *Butler*, and the other Sea-Officers, from having any Design to advantage themselves by the Loss of this Ship, that he himself actually suffered by this Accident more than the Value of 500 *l.* and his Successor, Captain *Soul*, lost all that he had in her; and Mr. *Harris*, who was then Purser of her, and now is in being, had a very considerable Loss: But yet such Care was taken of the Merchant's Money, (which was 6000 *l.* or more) that it was all sav'd; and as Captain *Butler* received the usual Freight, so was Mr. *Harris* rewarded with 200 *l.* by the Merchants for his particular Care in that matter.

Now, if Captain *Butler*, or any other of the Sea-Commanders, had (as is insinuated) any Design to enrich themselves upon the score of what might be pretended to be in this Ship, they could as well have taken the Money of the Merchants on Board of their own Ships, and alledged that it was lost with her. But it is altogether impossible to do such a thing as this with Secrecy: For 'tis not the Captains alone who know what is put on Board their Ships; their Officers and Men are equally sensible of it, and 'twould be a very hard matter to stop all their Mouths: Or if they were not so, do not the very Captains give Regular Receipts to the Merchants for what they receive, and those Gentlemen an Account thereof to their Correspondents at home? And instead of the Commadore's making himself Master of so great a Sum as is alledged, it is affirm'd unto me by Gentlemen who were with him at *Jamaica*, That he did not esteem his whole Estate to be worth more than 2000*l*, if so much, when he came from thence; and part of that he had served for many Years before.

The most of what was to be got, fell to the Share of two *Jamaica* Privateers that

that came into the Squadron; for while our Ships, Officers, and Men, were actually employed in Attacking the Enemy, they (according to their known Custom) were Plundering the Country, and seizing what they could meet with at Sea; insomuch, that they carried with them to *Jamaica* near the Value of 10000 *l.* as I am credibly informed; where they divided the Spoil, and soon saw the end of it by their extravagant and voluptuous way of living.

I have now given the Account which is represented to be necessary in the last Paragraph of Colonel *Lillingston's* Book, by quoting the Vouchers I had, and have, for that part of my *Memoirs* which relates to the aforementioned Expedition. I own that I did, and do, give so much Credit to them, as Papers under the Hands of Gentlemen may reasonably deserve; and am of Opinion, That no Officer does presume to insert any thing in his Journal, which he cannot safely justify by Oath. It is not to be doubted but when the Com-madore writ his Letter to the Lords of the Admiralty, those Misunderstandings which had happened during the Voyage were fresh in his Memory, and

'tis probable that the Tartness of some of his Expressions proceeded chiefly from that Cause, as 'tis reasonable to believe those of Colonel *Lillingston's* have done. For my own part, I had no Design to reflect personally on any one concerned; nor have I now any such Inclination: And as I cannot think Colonel *Lillingston's* Remarks on my self will prejudice me in my Reputation, so shall not any thing interrupt my carrying on a Second Work, I have already made some Progress in, and which will give me as much, or more trouble than my first, but the want of Health and Time; for since I am resolved to do it with all imaginable Candor and Care, so will it be submitted to a general Inspection, without any Apprehension of Prejudice it can receive from the Censure of any particular Person.

It now remains, That I insert several Extracts of the Journals of the Sea-Officers, which (if I judge right) will in a very great measure justify me, as to what I did formerly, and have now writ on this Subject.

Extracts

EXTRACTS of JOURNALS
of the Sea-Officers, and
others, viz.

Shewing the Reasons of the Com-
madore's Sailing from the Ma-
dera's, when Colonel Lilling-
ston was left behind.

Commissary Murry.

AT Anchor off the Madera's.— About Feb. 13.
 8 in the Morning I went on Board 1694.
 the Commadore, to wait on him and Colonel
 Lillingston; and finding them disposed to
 go on Shoar, I waited on the Colonel and
 Major in my own Ship's Boat, which was
 the Jefferys, and heard the Colonel give
 his Assistant Orders to go on Board all the
 Ships that carried the Captains of the Regi-
 ment, to Order them on Shoar, with one
 of their Officers, if they thought fit, and
 no more, to buy Wine, and what else they
 wanted for their Men. The Shoar in this
 Bay, is a great Beach with large Pebble-
 Stones, which makes a very raging, break-

ing Sea, with the least Wind at South; and so we found it; for though this Morning when we Landed there was no Wind, yet it having been at South the Day before, it left the Sea so high on the Beach, that it was very troublesome to Land.

About Three in the Afternoon the Wind veering a little at South, I went to the Beach again to get off to my Ship, but found my Boat broke from her Grapnel, and bulged on the Shoar, the Sea being then broken and high to the Beach, to that degree, that none of our Boats could come near it; But being resolved to lye on Board my Ship, I did, as several of the Sea-Officers did, hire a Portuguese Boat to put me on Board the Winchester's Pinnace, which rid at her Grapnel at some distance from the Beach. These Portuguese Boats are made to be hauled upon the Beach; out of the reach of the Surfe of the Sea, from whence they Launch them on occasion; and so I got off that Evening, and came to the Fleet in the Winchester's Boat.

14. About Nine this Morning I borrowed the George's Boat to put me on Board the Commadore, whom I found very uneasy, having sent his Boat to the Beach for the Colonel and Major; and the Weather growing more unsettled, and apprehending the
Danger

Danger the Fleet was in from the Southerly Winds in this Road; he made the Signals for Sailing about Three, and about Eight his Pinnace returned, but without Colonel or Major; and then, though the Sea rowled very high, I took the Opportunity of the Commadore's Pinnace, for which I waited all Day, and went on Board my own Ship, and was no sooner there, than there fell a most terrible Storm of Rain, Thunder, and Lightning; and this 24 Hours the Wind veered to all Points in the Compass. About 10 this Night the Cammadore made his Signal for weighing, and was under Sail about Eleven.

Captain Fletcher, of the Terrible-Fireship.

A Deep tumbling Sea came in; and Feb. 14. about 4 in the Evening our Comma- 1694. dore loos'd his Topsails and reefed them; and at 8 made his Signal for weighing; and accordingly about 11 we weighed. At 12 the Wind came up at S. W.

At 6 this Morning we tack'd and stood 15. Southward, there being no more than four Sail of the Fleet. At 8 we tack'd again, and stood to the West, and then lost two of

of our Company. At 10 tack'd and stood to the South, there being no more than the Commadore and my self.

Lieutenant *Hickman*, Third of the *Dunkirk*.

Feb. 15. 1694. **A**T the Madera's, very hard Squalls of Wind, with much Rain. Yesterday our Long-Boat was stav'd upon the Rocks. At 12 last Night we made the Signal, and weighed in the Morning. We lost Company of all the Fleet, except the *Terrible*, and left behind us our Long-Boat with 25 Men and Casks.

16. Very hard Gales with close Weather and Rain.

17. Fresh Gales with close Weather and Rain.

Lieutenant *Farquaharson*, of the *Reserve*.

Feb. 12. 1694. **A**T 5 in the Afternoon we Anchored at the Madera's with all the Fleet.

14. The Winds variable, and much Rain, Thunder, and Lightning. At 11 at Night Commadore *Wilmot* made a Signal for the Fleet

Fleet to weigh. At 12 we weighed, and stood Westward. At one tack'd, and stood Eastward, the Wind blowing extraordinary hard.

The Winds variable round the Compass, 16. blowing extraordinary hard, with Rain.

Captain Soul, of the Firebrand-Fireship.

THE Wind round the Compass, with Feb 15. Squalls of Rain, and misty Weather. 1697.

At 6 this Morning the Ruby made the Signal for weighing, which she did, the Wind at N. N. W. but the Wind coming to the South, she could not get out, so she Anchor'd again. At 10 a Clock we lower'd our Yards and Topmasts, having a fresh Gale of Wind, and a deep Sea. At 4 we got up our Yards and Topmasts. And at 5 sailed with seven Merchant Ships.

That

That the Commadore had given
Sailing Orders before he left
the Madera's.

Commissary Murry.

Feb. 19. **I** Was of Opinion it was for the Service
that we lost no time in making the best
of our way to Savona to stop the Effing-
ham, George, and Reliefe, that carried
500 of our Land-Men, not doubting but
they were proceeded on their Voyage to pur-
sue their Charter-parties, because they came
out with us; for the Commadore having
appointed to meet the Swan Frigate at Sa-
vona, we could not miss of him there, if
we beat it not up too long here; and accord-
ingly we proceeded this Day about 12 a
Clock, for the following Reasons offer'd at
the Consultation.

- I. From the Mutinous Disposition of
the Officers on Board the Jefferys.
- II. From the Nature of the Winds,
and that they seem'd to be settled
against us.
- III. From the Apprehension we had
of the want of Beer and Water.
- IV. From

IV. From the absolute necessity there was that some Ships should speed to Sargona.

V. To prevent the Ruine of the Service, if any of the Merchants Ships should proceed on their Voyage, by stopping them there.

The Reason of Captain Butler's
Captain Butler, of the Winchester.

IT was agreed at a Council of War, that Feb. 4.
the Swan should go to St. Domingo 1694.
with a Packet to the Governor, and she accordingly went from us; and 'twas agreed, That our Squadron should go on the South-side of Hispaniola for the better concealing us from the Enemy.

Captain Fletcher, of the Terrible Fireship.

THis Day our Commadore called a Feb. 4.
Council of War, in order to know 1694.
the Opinions of the Captains, which side of the Island of Hispaniola the Fleet should pass, that is to say, on the North or South, in order to Attack the French on the said Island: And it was agreed to send Captain Moses to St. Domingo, to see if the Governor there had got Forces to join us;
according

according to the Orders he received from the Court of Spain, and then to come up to Savona to give the Fleet Intelligence, that we might order Affairs accordingly.

The Reason of Captain Butler's Firing on the Coast of Guardalupe; which confirms the Account which the said Captain, and others give of this Matter.

Commissary Murry.

Feb. 20.
1697.

A Bout Three in the Afternoon we cleared the Point that opens the Bay of Bassa Terra in Guardalupe, which discover'd to us, at two Leagues distance, a Ship at Anchor in that Bay; whereupon Captain Butler prepared to make all things ready to bring her out, and we could presently discover that the Ship hawled as close to the Shoar as 'tis possible, under a Battery of about 20 Guns. We stood in after her under English Colours, and observed several Batteries; from some of which the Enemy fired upon us, which we return'd from our Ships; but

but being too far off, the Shot did no Execution, and so we stood off about Five, to prosecute our Voyage.

Shewing that the Squadron could not Sail sooner than they did, from Samina-Bay.

Captain Moses, of the Swan.

V Ariable Winds, with Showers of Rain Apr. 23
all Day and Night. 1695.

Part Rain, part hard Gales, and variable. 24.

This Day and Night the Wind and Weather as before. 25.

Before we could make an end of scrubbing the Ship, we had Showers of Rain, and it blew very hard all round the Compass. 26.

This Noon we had the Sea-breeze, and in the Night the Wind off of the Shoar. 27.

This Morning the Commadore and all the Fleet unmoored, but being Calm, could not get out. 28.

At 4 this Morning we all weighed our Anchors, and set Sail. 29.

Captain

Captain Butler, of the Winchester.

- Apr. 23 **T** His 24 Hours cloudy Weather with
1695. Lightning, and it blew fresh.
24. This 24 Hours cloudy Weather with
Rain.
25. This 24 Hours cloudy Weather, with
Thunder, Lightning, and Rain.
26. This 24 Hours cloudy dark Weather, with
Thunder, Lightning, and a great deal of
Rain.
27. This 24 Hours little Wind.

**Lieutenant Farquaharson, of the
Reserve.**

- Apr. 22 **S** Qually Weather, with Thunder and
1695. Lightning.
23. Variable Winds, with Rain.
24. A moderate Gale, with close Weather.
25. Winds variable, with Thunder, Light-
ning, and Rain.
26. Squally Weather with Thunder, Light-
ning and Rain.
27. The like.
28. A moderate Gale, and fine Weather.

That

That there was time lost at
St. Domingo, before things
 could be accommodated with
 the *Spanish General*.

Commissary Murry.

WE continued at this place ten Days, Apr. 5.
 notwithstanding the great Endeavour 1695,
 yours us'd by the Commadore and Colonel
Lillingston, to dispatch and ascertain the
 Assistance they came about; and after se-
 veral Conferences, Papers, and Translations
 of them, we came to some Agreement; and
 the Governor did thereupon promise to joyn
 us with 1500 Men at *Manchaneel-Bay*,
 the 2d of May.

Captain Fletcher, of the *Terrible- Fireship*.

THis Morning our Commadore, Colo- Apr. 6
 nel, and Captain, went on Shoar, and 1695.
 after two or three Hours debate, the Presi-
 dent agreed to Assist us with Men; but in
 the Evening sent off, and desired our Pro-
 positions in Writing.

I

This

7. *This Morning the Propositions were sent on Shoar, some whereof were liked, and some disliked, so came to no Conclusion.*
8. *This Morning our Commadore went on Shoar again, and after a strong Debate it was concluded, That the President of Hispaniola should Assist us with 1500 Men, and that he would meet us at Manchaneel-Bay, within twenty Days after the Articles should be sign'd and ratified.*
9. *This Day the President sat in Council, but nothing was done.*
13. *This Afternoon our Commadore adjusted all Matters with the President, and Writings were ordered to be drawn up on both sides; and it was agreed we should stay four Days in the Bay of Manchaneel, in order to Refresh the Spaniards after their Travel.*
15. *This Day the Articles were carried on Shoar, and Sign'd and Seal'd on both sides, and at half an Hour past One the next Day we sailed, but tack'd, and stood in to the Shoar the next Morning.*

Relating to the Action at *Cape*
François.

Captain Butler, of the *Winchester.*

AT Six this Morning a Council of War May 16
was held on Board the *Dunkirk*; and 1695.
at Eleven, by Order of the Commadore, I
went on Board the Spanish Admiral, with
a Letter in Answer to his; by which he de-
sir'd to Command the Fleet one Day, and
the Commadore another, which could not be
granted.

This Afternoon the Fort at Cape Fran- 20.
çois left Firing, but the *Swan* with the
two Fireships continued till four. At half
an Hour past Four, the Flag in the Fort
was taken down, and continued so for a
quarter of an Hour, and then it was hoist-
ed again. At half an Hour past Five the
Fort blem up, and in an Hour after the
Town was set on Fire by the Inhabitants,
who fled for Port de Paix. This Place
was very regularly fortified with a strong
Fort, and several Batteries, containing in
all about 30 Guns; the Inhabitants being
in Number near 800, besides Women and
Children.

20. *About Six at Night the Spanish General came into the Town, and sent to desire, That the English Flag might be struck, which we had hoisted on the Fort: And the Commadore sent me on Shoar to acquaint him with the Reason of hoisting it, which was our conquering the Place, and that it should be struck after Sun-set.*

Captain Soul, of the Firebrand-Fireship.

May 19 **T** *His Day about half an Hour past Four in the Afternoon, I went on Shoar, and set Fire to several Houses; and about Five in the Evening the French blew up their Fort at Cape François, and set Fire to the Town.*

Captain Moses, of the Swan.

May 18 **A** *T Four in the Afternoon the Commadore, and all our Men of War, four Transport-Ships, and three Spanish Men of War anchor'd at Cape François, and in the Evening landed all our Soldiers in Lemonado-Bay, about four Miles to the Eastward of the Cape.*

At

At Ten this Morning, the Commadore 19.
 ordered me and the two Fireships to go and
 Anchor against a Plantation, about a Mus-
 quet-shot to the Northward of the Fort.
 We anchored, and fired at the Houses in the
 Plantations (which were in a Bay) and at
 the Fort; and the Fort fired very hot at
 us. Between Four and Five in the After-
 noon we went on Shoar, and burnt all the
 Houses on the Bay; and about half an Hour
 after the Houses were on Fire, the French
 blew up their Fort, set their Town on Fire,
 and fled. There being a very good Path
 that led to the back of the Fort, we went
 a-shoar at the back of the Town, where we
 found four Stockade-Forts, besides the Town-
 Fort of 11 Guns; and there was in all 36
 Guns.

This Day some of the English and Spa- 20.
 nish Soldiers marched into the Town. There
 was a Jack-Flag hoisted in the Fort by the
 Commadore's Order.

All the Transport-Ships that were left to 23.
 the Eastward, anchored here, except the
 Terra Nova; and in the Evening I re-
 ceived Orders to go look for her: The next
 Day met her, and ordered her to stand in
 for the Cape.

*Captain Fletcher, of the Terrible
Fireship*

May 20
1695.

T His day Captain Moses, Captain Soul, and my self, went on Shoar to the House with our Boats and Men, and burnt it. At Six the French blew up the Fort; and at Ten we landed with our Pinnaces and Crews, and found several Houses on Fire. The French had laid Trains to blow up our Men, but they took little Effect, save that Captain Launce in the Reserve had the Misfortune to be hurt in the Head and Thigh; so we saved what Goods we could out of the Fire, though it considerable, and return'd to our Ships.

*Lieutenant Hickman, Third of the
Dunkirk.*

May 17
1695.

T His Morning we anchored at Cape François with all the Fleet, and landed 500 Soldiers to joyn the Spanish Army.

19.

This Morning the Swan, and Terrible and Firebrand Fireships, were ordered into the Shoar, to Fire at a parcel of Houses; and

and about Five in the Afternoon the French blew up their Fort, upon which we landed with our Boats, and found the Enemy were fled into the Woods.

This Morning the Army entred the Town. 22.

This Day the Spanish Army, with most 25.
of the English, took their Departure to travel to Port de Paix.

Lieutenant Turner, of the Ruby.

THis Day we carried 27 Soldiers out of May 14
the Effingham in our Long-Boat, and 1695.
25 Granadeers out of the Jefferys, to joyn
the Spanish Camp, with 10 Boats more in
our Company with Soldiers in them, and
Ammunition. At 12 at Noon we landed
them 12 Miles from the Ships, where the
Spanish Camp was.

Memorandum, By this it appears, The
Boats of the Men of War were
employed in Landing the Artille-
ry, &c. for the Army.

Our Commadore, this Day about Noon, 19.
fired several Shot at the Fort at Cape
Fran ois, whereupon the French hoisted
their White Flage, and fired at him again;
and the Swan went in near the Fort, and
fired several Shot, and they at her.

Lieutenant Stiles, of the Swan.

May 18
1695.

AT Three this Afternoon, Commadore Wilmot came from Machaneel-Bay, and anchored here, having in Company the remaining part of our Ships of War, and four Transport-Ships, with three Spanish Men of War. Before they came the length of where we Rid, all the Land-Forces were embark'd in the Boats, and landed in the East part of the Bay.

19.

We plied our Guns against some Houses which stood apart from the Town. About Six my Captain, and some other Officers landed, and set Fire to the Houses. About Seven in the Evening, the Enemy blew up the Fort that fired against us, and set part of the Town on Fire, and fled. About Ten all the Boats went a-shoar to the Town, where we found near half of it on Fire, and several Houses blew up by Trains laid by the Enemy.

Lieutenant

Lieutenant Farquaharson, of the
Reserve.

THis Afternoon Commadore Wilmot, May 18
with the rest of our Fleet of Men of 1695.
War and Merchant Ships, anchored here,
and sent our Soldiers on Shoar. About 7
our Barges went in, and attacked a Planta-
tion, where some Men were intrenched; and
there was a hot Dispute for some time.

At 11 a Clock the Swan went in, and 19.
battered the New Fort, where she received
several Shot, and she likewise fired at a Plan-
tation against her. In the Afternoon, about
3 a Clock, the French struck their Flag at
the New Fort, the Swan firing at them;
but they soon hoisted it again. About 4 a
Clock I went on Shoar in our Boat, with
Captain Moses, and several others Boats,
and burnt a Plantation opposite to where
the Swan lay. Near 6 the French blew
up their New Fort, set the other on Fire,
and deserted the Town. We went in with
our Boats, but found the Town on Fire,
and that several Trains were laid in the
Houses; but none of our Men received any
great hurt, but Captain Launce. About
Noon, Commadore Wilmot caused the
Union

Union-Flag to be hoisted at the New Fort.

Relating to the Proceedings at
Port de Paix.

Captain Butler, of the Winchester.

June 6.
1695.

AT Two the Swan fired several Shot on Shoar to clear the Hedges, they being lined with French; and in half an Hour after, all the Ships Boats went from the Commadore along Shoar within Musquet-shot; and there were several Vollies fired from each other. At Seven all the Boats in the Fleet went a-shoar, and landed Men, who burnt the Houses that were left standing by the French.

II. At Ten at Night the Commadore, myself, with most of the Captains in the Squadron, went on Shoar, with about 600 Men, in order to Surprize the Enemy; but they left the Trenches. We marched within Shot of the Fort of Port de Paix, from whence several great Shot were fired.

At Five this Morning, I landed with 60 of my Men, and joyn'd the Commadore, and the rest of the Captains, who likewise landed with their Men. We marched up to Port de Paix, where we were inform'd our Army came last Night. We consulted with Colonel Lillingston, the Spanish General, and the rest of the Officers, what was to be done, in order to Reduce the Fort; and it was agreed, That Colonel Lillingston and the Spanish General should each of them send a Summons to the Fort to Surrender, which was accordingly done; but Answer was return'd, That they would Defend it to the utmost.

In the Afternoon, the Commadore, myself, and the rest of the Sea-Officers, went on Shoar to the Westward of Port de Paix, with about 200 Seamen, to clear the way up to an Hill on the Westside of the Fort, where we design'd to raise a Battery; and having done it, we sent the Men on Board till the Dusk of the Evening, and then landed 3 Six pounders from the Swan, securing them among the Thickets till Morning, and sent our Men on Board again to refresh themselves. At break of Day they were put on Shoar again, and immediately went to work to hawl the Guns up to the top of the Hill, which, by reason of the steepness,

sleepness, took up the greatest part of the Day.

23. About 250 English Seamen more, with 200 Spaniards, were landed, and joyn'd the rest; so that now our Camp on the West-side of the Fort consisted of near 700 Men, and by 10 we got up the three Field-Pieces.

25. At 4 in the Afternoon our Long-Boat went on Board the George, and took in a Brass Field-Peice for Colonel Lillingston for the East-Battery. We plaid upon the Enemy most part of the Afternoon from our Battery of Six Guns, they not firing one Shot; but in the Morning they fired several at our Men that were at Work upon the Westernmost Battery; loaden with old Iron, broken Glass Bottles, &c. At 6 the Com-madore went to the other Camp to confer with Colonel Lillingston, and returned about three Hours after.

26. By break of Day we began to play again from the middle Battery, our Men still continuing their Work.

27. We continued firing from the middle Battery till Five in the Afternoon, and were answer'd from the Fort; and now our South-ward

ward Battery being finished, we began to play on the Enemy from that.

At break of Day we began to ply our 28.
Guns from all our Batteries on the West-side of the Fort, and continued till Noon, at which time the Enemy lying intrenched behind their Pallisadoes, fired incessantly small and great Shot, some of which came into our Camp, and thorough and over our Tents. Our Guns from the West-Battery did considerable Execution upon the Castle, and few of our Shot were made in vain.

At Two Afternoon we began afresh from 29.
all our Batteries, the French continuing to Fire great and small Shot, which gauled us very much. At 6 in the Evening most of our Principal Officers being at the Westermost Battery, viewing where it was most convenient to annoy the Enemy, an unfortunate Shot came amongst us, and killed Lieutenant Herne of the Dunkirk, who Commanded a Company on Shoar, with a Reformed, and wounded the Commadore, Colonel Beckford, Deputy-Governor of Jamaica, Captain Hughes of the Ruby, myself, Mr. Bernard, and my Lieutenant, Lieutenant Penotier of the Experiment. Besides which, several Men were wounded in the Afternoon.

We

30. We continued Firing very smartly from all our Batteries, which did considerable Damage to the Walls of the Castle, and to the outward Walls; and the Enemy did not Fire so briskly at us as Yesterday. We dismounted the Gun that did us so much Mischief, and threw in several Granadoes from our Hand-Mortars, which we could perceive put the Enemy into great Disorder. We had an Account from the Spanish Army, that about 50 Negroes made their Escape from the Fort last Night, of which they had taken about 20.

July 1. We continued to Fire very briskly from all sides, and the French at us, till 4 in Afternoon, by which time we forced them to leave their Guns. We had now enlarged the Breach that we had made on the West-side.

3. We now began to make Scaling-Ladders, and to get all things ready for a Storm. In the Afternoon we got up two more Eighteen Pounders to enlarge the Breaches, and early in the Morning we began to work upon a new Battery, and by keeping a continual Fire with great and small Shot, Bombs, and Granadoes, the Castle and outward Walls were so shattered, that the Commadore was resolved very suddenly to Storm the Fort.

We

We continued Firing from 12 to 8 at Night. About 10 came in an English Negro, having escaped out of the Fort, who informed us, That the French were all prepared with every Man his Arms, and what Baggage he could carry, to leave the Fort, and by the favour of the Night to make their Escape for Pettit-Guavas; upon which we were ordered to Arms with all the silence possible, and four Companies were ordered to march down into the Sitona, to wait for the Enemy's issuing out; which we had no sooner done, than we perceived them coming out at one of the Breaches. We let them pass till we were between them and the Fort, and then gave them a Volly of small Shot; they fired at us again, and then ran in great Confusion, throwing away their Bundles and Arms for haste. By this time all our Seamen were drawn down into the Valley, and Lieutenant-Colonel Hughes, with the Vantguard, pursued the Enemy to a River which they were obliged of necessity to Ford, and killed a great number of them; after which he drew off his Men, and marched back again, taking several Prisoners; and the Spaniards being posted near the River, pursued the Enemy, killing all they met with. I presently set up the English Colours; and now, amongst the Seamen and Soldiers, was minded nothing but Plundering

dering and Drinking. We found likewise about the Fort between 80 and 90 great Guns, but all except 3 or 4 were spiked up.

5. We left the full Possession of the Fort to Colonel Lillingston's Men; and several Prisoners, both Whites and Negroes, were taken in the Woods, and others came to the English of their own accord, desiring Quarter; which was granted; and we were inform'd many more would have done the same, but for fear of the Spaniards, who killed all they found.

17. At 6 at Night the Castle blew up, and the Houses being burnt, as well as the Pallisades, our men return'd on Board at half an Hour past 3 in the Morning; and then we unmoor'd, and at 6 weigh'd, and made Sail.

Captain Soul, of the Firebrand-Fireship.

June 11. 1695. **T**His Morning we march'd within Shot of the Fort of Port de Paix, which fired upon us, and in our return we burnt and destroyed all we could meet with; and at four in the Afternoon came on Board again.

This

This morning the Commadore and all the Captains with their Boats went on Shoar to the Army, which we found lying about a Mile from Port de Paix, and at 4 afternoon we left them, and went off.

3.

This day we had a Consultation about landing the Field-Pieces and Mortars, which was agreed upon, and they were landed at 9 at night.

16.

At 5 this morning we landed 3 Field-Pieces, and then our Battery consisted of 6 Guns. This night the most of us laid ashore to disspatch the Battery, which we did by working Day and Night.

21.

This day we play'd our Guns at the Fort, and they at us.

22.

This day we got two Guns more on Shoar, which were the Dunkirk's Gun-Deck Guns, within two Thirds Point-blank Musquet-Shot, and it was a good Battery.

23.

This day we ply'd our Guns from both Batteries, and beat the Enemy from their Guns; the Spaniards got two Guns on Shoar, and fired likewise, we making large Breaches in their Walls, and our Camp consisted of 400 Men.

24.

25. All the Captains took Spell and Spell two Hours apiece at the lower Battery, to manage the Guns, with two Gunners and 20 Sailers.

26. This day we fired our Guns, using our Endeavours to destroy the Fort.

27. This day we could perceive we had made a large Breach in their Walls, they firing but now and then a Gun, which made the Place too hot for them.

July 4.
1695. At half an Hour past One this Morning, all Sallied out of the Fort that were able, which we judged to be between three and four hundred. Our People meeting with them, soon gave us notice, so that we killed a great many of them, and pursued the rest to a River about a Mile from Port de Paix. The Spaniards met them on the other side, and kill'd a great many of them. Then we went into the Fort, and found a sad ruined Place, with about 40 wounded Men, Women and Children, and afterwards the Soldiers came in, so that we fell to Plundering and Ruining all we could.

16. At 6 this Evening we blew up the Fort of Port de Paix, and set all the Houses on fire in it. We and the Spaniards took out

out of the Fort 78 Guns that were mounted, it being now all demolished.

Captain Moses, of the Experiment.

AT 8 this Morning our Commadore, June 6. and most of the Captains of our 1695. Men of War landed with about 300 Men, and we marched within 3 Miles of the Fort of Port de Paix, and burnt several good Plantations; the French running before us towards their Fort: And in the Evening we went all on board our Ships.

This Morning there was a Consultation on board the Commadore. At 4 in the Afternoon our Fleet weighed Anchor, and run between 3 and 4 Miles to the Westward of the Place we weighed from, and at 5 in the Evening we Anchor'd in five Fathom Water. At Eleven at night the Commadore landed with about 500 English, and 100 Spaniards. We marched near half a Mile from the Water-side, and lay in an Idico Piece all Night. 10.

This Morning at Day-light we marched towards the Fort, being in hopes to meet with some of our Army, the time being expired the Spaniards proposed to be at Port de Paix. We went through Brest-Works, 11.
K 2

Works, where there were several French Men, but they all run away to their Fort, without firing a Small-Arm. We marched within Point-blank Shot of the Fort, and they fired several at us. We could not meet with our Army, so we returned, and in our return we destroyed all the Plantations we met with, and in the Evening went all on board our Ships.

14. This Afternoon we had an Account that our Army was within a Mile of Port de Paix.

15. This Morning at Day-light our Com-
 Note, madore landed with about the same Number of Men he did the 10th, and marched to our Army. At Noon we met with them, there being near all the Spaniards that went from Cape François, but not 200 of above 700 English, and most of them Sick. The Colonel told us, that the rest of them, except 40 or 50 that he had lost in their March, were about 4 or 5 Miles off. It was agreed to land our Artillery next Night, and in the Evening we got on board our Ships.

16. In the night we landed 4 Brass Guns, one Mortar, and other Necessaries for that Service.

This

This Night we landed 6 Guns, and all 20.
things belonging to them.

This Morning at Day-light I landed with 21.
150 Men, and got the Guns we landed
last Night on the Top of a Hill, that was
higher than the Castle. At Noon our Com-
madore, and the rest of our Squadron, an-
chored to the Westward of us; and in the
Afternoon he came on Shoar with about 250
Men. In the Evening we began to make
a Breast-work with our great Guns, and
work'd all Night.

This Morning we mounted the afore- 22.
mention'd Guns, within Small-Arm-shot of
the Castle, and saluted the Enemy with a
Messenger from the Mouth of our Cannon;
and they failed not to answer us.

We continued firing at the Enemy, the 23.
Night being very Dark with Rain. We
went with four Boats mann'd, and arm'd,
on Board a French Ship that lay close un-
der the Castle. We cut her Cables, and all
the Fasts we could find, and got our Boats
a-head; but after going near half a Cable's
length, she brought up by the Stern, by a
Fast which I suppose was under Water, and
swang a-ground, so left her, having 2 Men
kill'd, and 6 wounded.

24. This Day we mounted two 24 Pounders, about half a Mile below the first Batteries, which did great Service. We fired from both Batteries at the Enemy.

27. This Day we had two Men killed, and our Commadore and several others were wounded by an unfortunate Shot at the lower Battery.

July 3. In the Evening, it being my Guard-night, I went down in the Salena, (with 50 Men) that lies between our Hill, and the Fort. I placed my self in the Path that leads from the Fort towards Petit-Guavas.

4. About One this Morning, took a Negro that came out of the Fort, who informed me, That the Enemy were all prepared to make their Escape. Upon which, I immediately sent him to the Commadore, who made all the haste he could down in the Salena, with all the Men he had; and about half an Hour after One they accordingly came: My Centinels diserying them, fired; after which, the Enemy gave us a large Volly, which was returned. They then made the best of their way, and we pursued them above 2 Miles, till we could see none but what we had taken and killed. There came

came out of the Fort 500 Men in Arms, and about 100 Men and Women without. The Fort is very strong, having 80 Guns, and 64 Foot high from the Salena. It is founded on a Rock fronting to the Sea, and to the Land there is a flat Salena, which in time of Rain is full of Water. In the Afternoon we began to free the French Ship, which lay under the Fort, that was sunk by the Shot that was fired at her when I went to bring her off.

This Day we freed the French Ship, and brought her to an Anchor by the Commadore; and we began to bring off our Guns.

Lieutenant Hickman, Third of the Dunkirk.

THis Morning we landed about 600 June 6. Seamen, and burnt and destroyed 1695. Port Louis, and all round for 5 Miles.

About 11 at Night, the Commadore landed with about 700 Seamen, and to-morrows Day took his March towards Port de Paix; but coming open with the Fort, they fired so hot, that we were forced to retreat.

14. This Evening we had Information, That our Army was arrived and encamped near Port de Paix; and the next Morning the Commadore, with about 300 Seamen, marched to the Camp.
16. We landed last Night several Pieces of Ordnance.
21. This Morning we weighed with the Fleet, and ran down to the Leeward of Port de Paix, and there anchored near the Shoar, and landed 6 Guns.
22. We kept our Men, Night and Day, employ'd in raising the Battery.
23. This Morning we began to batter with our Guns, and landed 4 Guns more.
- July 4. 1695. At half an Hour past One this Morning, the Enemy endeavoured to make their Escape, but many of them were destroyed.
- 8.1 This Night the Ruby, Swan, and Firebrand, were ordered to go and lye under the Walls of the Fort, to secure the Men that were demolishing it.
16. This Day, between Five and Six in the Afternoon, we blew up the Fort of Port de Paix,

Paix; and the next Morning we came to
Sail with the Fleet bound to Jamaica.

Lieutenant Farman, Second of the
Dunkirk.

AT half an Hour past Twelve at Noon, June 6.
we anchored with the Fleet at Port Louis, 1695.
about four Leagues to the Eastward
of Port de Paix. In the Afternoon the
French set Fire to several Houses. At
Three a Clock the Commadore, and all the
Captains, went close under the Shoar in their
Boats, where they had several Shot fired at
them by the Enemy that lay along shoar in
the Bushes; and they fired again from the
Boats, and so continued for the space of
two Hours. We fired also from several of
the Ships, at Parties of the French that
marched along the Shoar, towards a great
House at a Plantation. At the same time
the Commadore made a Signal for all Boats
to be ready mann'd and armed; and at
Eight himself, and the rest of the Captains,
with their Boat M Crews, landed. At
Noon the Town of Port de Paix was set
on Fire.

This Afternoon, the Commadore with his
Party burnt the Town of Port Louis, and
the

the Houses thereabouts, and at the same time took three French Prisoners, who reported, That the French, and all their Negroes, were gone to Port de Paix. At Seven at Night, all the Boats came on Board again.

11. At Nine at Night, the Commadore, with the rest of the Captains, landed, and about 500 Men, and marched to a Plantation, a Mile from the Water-side. At Eleven, we had a Party of French fired at us through a Hedge, and we gave them two Vollies again. At Four in the Morning we marched towards Port de Paix. At Nine came in sight of the Fort, about two Miles from it. They fired at us very briskly, which forced us to Retreat. We had no News of our Land-Army, nor could we see any sign of their being near hand, so that we embarked, and went on Board. This Morning the Town of Port de Paix was set on Fire by the Enemy.

12. At Eight at Night, our Lieutenant went a-board, and 15 more Men, and stayed all Night. In the Morning they burnt several Houses, and broke down the Enemies Sugar-Works at a great Plantation, about a Mile from the Water-side.

At

At Six in the Afternoon, a Party of the Spanish Army, and some of our English Soldiers, came down to the Water-side. The Commadore went on Shoar to them, and they told him, That the Army were encamp-
ed about seven Miles off, and within a Mile and half of the Castle. At Six in the Morn-
ing, the Commadore, and the rest of the Captains, landed with about 400 Men, and marched to the Camp, where he arrived at Ten; and with the Spanish General, our Colonel, and the Sea and Land-Officers, held a Council of War, and sent an English and Spanish Drum to the Castle, to know whether they would Surrender the Place; if not, they should have no Quarter. They sent word, That they would stand it out as long as there was a Man in the Castle; and at the return of the Messengers, sent two Shot after them.

15.

At Four in the Afternoon, we marched from the Camp towards our Boats. About Seven we embarked, and at Ten at Night came on Board. At Eight the next Morning, the Signal was made for a Council of War. At Noon our Long-Boat, with the rest of the Men of War's Boats, went on Board of the Transport-Ships, to take in the Field-Pieces and the Mortars, with the rest of the Artillery, and to Land them in the Night.

16.

At

17. At Ten at Night, the Commadore, with the rest of the Captains, and the Boats with the Artillery, went down to Port de Paix. At Four in the Morning, all were landed that were in the Boats, within a Mile of the Castle.

19. At Three in the Afternoon, the Commadore, with the rest of the Captains, went down in their Boats to Port de Paix, and had above 100 Shot fired at them from the Castle, one whereof went through the Experiment, and wounded two Men.

20. At Nine this Morning, the Commadore, with the rest of the Commanders, went to Leeward of Port de Paix, where they received above 30 Shot from the Enemy. They went there to clear a place for the landing of our Cannon.

23. At Four in the Afternoon, our Westernmost Battery began to play at the Fort, and continued till Six in the Evening, and at half an Hour past Seven in the Morning the Fort began to play at our Batteries.

24. At Three in the Afternoon, our Westernmost Battery began to play against the Fort, and continued so till Night. Several Men were killed and wounded.

At half an Hour past One our Battery began to play, and continued till night, and we began again at Four the next Morning.

This Morning we began to fire very smartly, and the Enemy answered us, and we continued firing so till the 30th.

At Four in the Morning we began to fire, and continued firing briskly till Seven at Night. Our three Batteries, I think, fired at least 350 Shot, besides Hand-Granades, and the small Shot played very hot.

We fired on the Enemy between Twelve a July 2. Clock and Eight, from our Three Batteries, 1695. 342 Guns, and 24 Granades.

We fired on the Enemy 276 great Shot, 19 Granades, and 11 Bombs.

We fired several Guns, Bombs, and Granades, from Twelve till Eight at Night. About half an Hour past Twelve, the French came out of the Fort, and fought their way thorough, but most part of them were kill'd, and the Seamen entered the Fort about Three in the Morning, where were about 50 Men, Women and Children in it, the Spaniards beeing in pursuit of those that fled.

At

6. At Five this Morning our Men came aboard, the Camp being broke up.

16. At Six at Night the Castle blew up, and at half an Hour past three in the Morning we unmoor'd.

Aug. 5. In the Afternoon we put on Shoar two Guns at Port Royal.

Lieutenant Stiles, of the Swan.

June 6. 1695. **I**N a short time after we came to an Anchor, we saw the Shoar lined with Men. We weighed, and anchored again about two thirds of a Musquet-shot from the Shoar. The Commadore in his Boats, attempted to Land; but finding a hot Resistance, returned aboard again. We fired several Broad-sides with round and Partridge-shot. This Morning all the Boats went a-shore mann'd and armed. The Enemy quitted their Houses, setting some on Fire. We found one House fortified with Six Guns, which we brought away, setting the House on Fire, as we also did a great many fine Plantations of Indico and Sugar.

At

At Eleven at Night, the Commadore, 10.
with about 400 Seamen out of the Men of
War, went on Shoar; but by that time we
had landed 50 Men, the Enemy began to
fire upon us, and we upon them. They
stood about 3 Vollies and then fled.

This Morning our Forces under Com- 11.
mand of the Commadore, marched to the
Westward to view the Garison, and to
discover where we could conveniently land
our Cannon and Mortars.

In the Evening, a Party of Land-Forces 14.
which marched by Land from Cape Fran-
çois, came to the Shoar-side, and gave us
an Account of the Forces being encamped a
Mile from the Fort.

This Morning our Commadore landed a 15.
little to the Westward of where we rid,
with about 400 Seamen, and marched to
the Camp, where a Council of War was
called by all the English and Spanish Sea
and Land Officers, and an English and
Spanish Drum were sent to the Fort of Port
de Paix, to know if they would Surrender,
if not, they should not expect any Quarter.
Their Answer was, They would defend
it as long as they were able.

20. In the Afternoon the Commadore, with about 300 Men, landed to the Westward of the Fort, and cut a Path through the Woods to the brow of a Hill, which looked into the Fort, to get up our Guns. In the Night we landed 3 of our Ship's Guns, and next Morning got them from the Shoar-side to the top of the Hill, where we design'd to mount them. We also landed out of the Men of War about 400 Seamen, and made a Camp to the Westward of the Fort; our Land Forces lay on the East side, and the Spaniards on the South side, in two Camps.

21. In the Night we landed 3 Field-Pieces, and this Morning got them up to the Top of the Hill; and we were raising Works for Batteries.

23. In the Night we landed 2 more Guns; one of 24l. Shot, and the other of 18, and the next Morning got them up the Hill.

Lieutenant Farquaharson, of the Reserve.

June 5. 1695. **A**T Port de Paix. About Two a Clock in the Afternoon, Commadore Wilmot, with

with most of the Boats in the Fleet mann'd and arm'd, went near the Shoar, where was a hot Dispute for some time between the Enemy and them.

This Morning Commadore Wilmot, with 7. about 300 Seamen landed, and sent Detachments to several places, but met with no Opposition, only our Forlorn-hope had a small Dispute with a Party of French, who were defeated.

The Commadore ordered a Detachment 21. of Men from on Board each Ship, to the number of 400, to raise Batteries against Port de Paix-Castle, and we wrought all Night.

We open'd our Trenches, and began to 22. Batter the Citadel with four Guns that we had mounted; three of them Saker-Iron-Guns, and the other a Brass Cutt. The Enemy ply'd us with great Shot and Partridge, our Batteries being within less than Musket-shot of the Castle.

We mounted two Guns, and plied all the 23. six, and they likewise at us.

We continued battering the Fort, and 24. raising of new Batteries; but the Enemy did

did not hoist their Colours, or fire any Guns this Day.

25. We continued raising of Batteries, and firing at each other all this Day.

26. Collonel Lillingston open'd his Trenches to Day, and fired several Shot into the Fort, and we mounted another 12 Pounder.

27. We plied our Guns at Port de Paix, and the Enemy at us; and we mounted one 12, one 24, and one 18 Pounder.

28. We plied our ten Guns on the Enemy, and they on us very briskly. And in the Afternoon, by a Cannon-shot, Lieutenant Herne of the Dunkirk was killed, and a Volunteer that belonged to the Winchester. At the same time Commadore Wilmot, Colonel Beckford, Lieutenant-Colonel Hughes, Major Butler, Lieutenant Penitier, and Lieutenant Bernard, received several Wounds.

July 3. About 11 at Night, the Enemy to the
1695. number of 500 Men, made an attempt to Escape out of the Fort. We attacked them, and kill'd about 200 in the pursuit.

About

About 4 this Morning, I went on Shoar 13:
by Order of Commadore Wilmot, with 50
Seamen from aboard the Reserve, in Or-
der to keep the Spaniards out of the Fort
of Port de Paix, and finding the Spani-
ards therein, I commanded them out, and
kept Possession till the Commadore sent a
Re-inforcement to me, and he came himself,
and told the Spanish Army that he would
keep Possession till he had his Dividend
from them that belonged to him by Articles,
the which they agreed to, after Considera-
tion.

Lieutenant Turner, of the Ruby.

At 12 at Noon we anchored within 3 June 5:
Miles Eastward of Port de Paix, 1695:
against some Plantation, within half a Mile
of that Shoar.

This Morning our Commadore made a 6:
Signal for all the Boats in the Fleet to go
a-shoar well-mann'd and armed; they found
little Value there, and destroyed the Ene-
mies Houses by setting them on Fire.

At 11 at Night the Commadore, with 10:
400 Men and their Captains went on Shoar
well-armed. When they came a-shoar, the
French

French fired at them out of the Bushes, and our People fired at them again, and at last the French run towards Port de Paix.

16. *This Day all our Long-Boats carried the Field-Pieces on Shoar, and all the Materials belonging to them, to Port de Paix, where the Camp was, and several Captains went in their Pinnaces to Guard the Artillery.*

20. *This Day our Long-Boat, with all the Long-Boats in the Fleet, were sent with Men and Ammunition to the Camp at Port de Paix.*

22. *In the Afternoon our Long-Boat was employed in carrying some Great Guns from the Dunkirk.*

SOME

SOME
REMARKS
ON OUR
West-India Expeditions.

HOW great the Charge hath been of our Foreign Expeditions, but more especially to the *West-Indies*, and what little benefit the Nation hath reaped therefrom, is too well known. This is a matter of so great Consequence to the Publick, as that it calls for the most serious Consideration, what Measures may be taken to render such Expeditions (when such there must be) more beneficial for the future.

Were I as well qualified to advise what ought to be done in this Affair, as I am sensible of Inconveniencies past, I could not better spend my time; but I know too well my own Incapacity, and therefore will only briefly touch

on some Things which have occur'd to me, in hopes that it may incline those of more Experience to employ their Thoughts about it.

The maintaining *Jamaica*, and other our *Ilands* and *Plantations*, is undoubtedly of great *Consequence*; foras they afford a very considerable *Revenue* to the *Crown*, and take off such of our *Manufactures* as employ many *Poor People*; so would it be greatly prejudicial, should any of them fall into the hands of the *Enemy*.

This *Nation* hath endeavour'd, and so hath *France* too, not only to keep their own in those *Parts* of the *World*; but We have often aim'd at the seizing, or destroying their *Plantations*, and *Settlements*, and They Our's, though (if I mistake not) neither the one or the other can reasonably put any great value upon what hath been done in that particular.

They were indeed more successful against the *Spaniards*, by making themselves *Masters* of *Carthage*, and fortunately bringing from thence very considerable *Riches*, notwithstanding the *Impediments* they met with in their *Passage*; but when had we an *Opportunity*, or at least when was there any
Attempt

Attempt made by us, from the beginning of the last War to this very time, where the Advantage proved, in any degree, equal to the Charge and Inconveniencies that did attend it?

The Injuries we did to the *French*, when Sir *Francis Wheeler* Commanded in the *West-Indies*, were inconsiderable: And what have our Successes been before and after that Expedition? I doubt it was found that our Squadrons came home in a much worse condition than when they were set forth, both as to Men, and all other Circumstances; and not having the good fortune to do any sensible Injuries to our Enemy, they had the satisfaction of knowing what Inconveniencies we involv'd our selves in.

Vice-Admiral *Nevil* was very unfortunate in those Parts, when he met with and chased Monsieur *Ponti*. He bore away the rich Spoil of *Carthagera* in sight of our Squadron, though I dare be positive that our Flag, as well as the Captains under his Command, did their utmost: But when those Materials which carried the *French* thorough the Seas, did, in a manner, interrupt our getting up to them, no wonder it was not in our Power to seize that valuable Booty: And even this was the fairest

Prospect we had of bettering our selves by our *West-India* Expeditions.

Not any thing of Consequence was done, or indeed could be, all the while Vice-Admiral *Benbow* Commanded in those Parts, at first with a small, but afterwards with a very considerable Squadron. When the Enemy were not so strong, he (though a good Officer) did unsuccessfully scour the Seas; but when they out-numbered us, he was constrain'd to remain at *Jamaica* for many Months together, otherwise the Island, or Ships, or both, would have been expos'd. There the Officers, as well as Seamen, imbibed the unwholsome Air, and were subjected to Inconveniencies seldom or never met with at Sea; and the Ships were at last almost rendred defenceless, and incapable of coming home.

The *French* seldom or never had such a Squadron in the *West-Indies*, as in the Year 1702, nor did they then put themselves to the Charge thereof upon the Score of attempting our Plantations: No, their design was to conduct home those Floating Warehouses of Silver, and rich Merchandizes that we were not able to seize in those Parts, but yet had the good fortune either

to take or destroy when harboured at *Vigo*.

In fine, I cannot recollect that one beneficial Service hath been performed in *America* for many Years past, either by our Squadrons or Land-Forces; at least not any that hath in any measure been answerable to the Expence, and other Misfortunes; and yet there is (as Affairs now are) a necessity of our having a Strength in those Parts, when the Enemy bend their Forces that way.

The several Islands and Plantations must unavoidably have such a number of Ships to attend on them, as other Services will conveniently admit of; but it may be worth consideration, whether numbers of Men of War, and chargeable Imbarcations, should for the future be tied down a long time at any particular Place, and that without a prospect of their being able to do Service.

The *French* have wisely fortify'd themselves in all their Settlements, in-somuch, that without Land-Forces, and a considerable Body of them too, we have but little hopes of doing any thing considerable against them: And if we happen to be stronger at Sea, they will undoubtedly have the necessary

iary Caution to preserve their Shipping; so that among others, they have these Advantages. With a Squadron and Land-Forces they can molest us, where we are defenceless; but we, with the one and the other, may find it difficult to prejudice them, because they have so well provided for their Security.

What is there then so necessary for us to do, as speedily to fortify our Islands in the best manner that possibly may be? That may be of Service to us, when Squadrons of Ships cannot; and the Enemy being sensible that we are in such a Posture, will hardly esteem it worth their while to send Squadrons of Ships, and Forces, to make Attempts where they are sure of meeting a warm Resistance; besides, we shall by this means be able to employ our Ships of War more to the Advantage of the Publick Service.

But if, notwithstanding what hath been, or may be said, it shall be esteem'd a Work of too great Difficulty and Charge to fortify, and otherwise strengthen our Plantations: And that there shall be a necessity of sending Squadrons of Ships for their Security; it is not doubted but the greatest Care will be taken (as far as the Motions of
the

the Enemy that way will permit) to dispatch them from hence, so as that they may be there in the most healthy Season of the Year, and not remain abroad in the sickly Months, which hath hitherto been so very pernicious to the Health of the Men.

There is not any thing which does so much occasion Distempers among the Seamen, when in the *West-Indies*, as their being frequently on Shoar; for there they subject themselves to numerous Inconveniencies, by various sorts of Intemperance; whereas it hath been experienced, that a constant Cruize to and fro between one Island and another, hath kept them almost in perfect Health.

There are other things (if I mistake not) which have, in no little measure, cramp't our *West-India* Expeditions; For instance;

1. The joyning Sea and Land-Officers in Councils of War, wherein they have but too often differed in their Sentiments. I am not in the least Partial on the one side or the other; for though I have, indeed, been much more conversant with the Sea-Officers than the Gentlemen in the Land-Service;

vice; yet have I a very great Esteem and Honour for the latter, as well upon the score of their Bravery, as good Behaviour. But yet their different Education, added to other Circumstances, which I fear may hereafter occasion Disputes, when joyn'd on Service, requires a serious Consideration, how such a Misfortune may be most effectually prevented.

The Sea-Officers must be esteemed the best Judges how to govern the Ships and Men under their Command; and it may be as reasonably concluded, that the Land-Officers do as much excel in Affairs on Shoar; wherefore when the Service shall require the sending a Squadron of Ships, and a Body of Soldiers, on a Foreign Expedition, may it not be reasonable to put those Soldiers, when Landed, under the immediate Command of their own proper Officers?

The Commadore of the Squadron ought to have the Management of all, while at Sea; but when the Forces come to the designed place of Landing, nothing should be farther expected from him, in relation to them, than the assisting in putting them on Shoar, protecting them in the best manner he can when there, and furnishing them

with

with things that are necessary, as far as he shall be able to do it.

As the Soldiers, when on Shoar, ought to be employed according to what shall be agreed by a Council of War of their own Officers; so should the Seamen, if they Land, and take their share of the Service, be likewise Commanded by theirs, and neither of them to interfere with the other, either in joynt Councils of War, or otherwise, but each endeavour to do their utmost for the Common Good.

'Tis not improbable that this Method may prevent those Disputes which often happen'd the last War, between the Sea and Land Officers, even to the great hinderance of those Services which they were debating how to put in Execution; but it is farther necessary, that the Services should first be well considered and digested at home, and proper and experienced Officers employed. The Strength should (in my humble Opinion) be greater than what may be reasonably expected to oppose them, for our Forces may, by many unforeseen Accidents, be lessen'd before they arrive at the place of Action: Nor is it less necessary, that the Instructions to the Commanding Officers

cers should be very particular and binding, and a severe Penalty laid on those, who upon the score of any private Pique, or otherwise, shall act any thing prejudicial to the Service wherein they are employed.

2. Another Inconvenience, and that no small one, hath frequently attended such Expeditions. It is the Plunder. In the last War that Matter was variously settled, but I think it never came (whatever it may do) to such a Regularity as to give a general Satisfaction. The Disputes that arose between the Sea and Land-Officers at *Port de Paix*, and which is more than once mention'd in the foregoing Sheets, is no small Instance of it; the Soldiers then complain'd they got nothing, and the Seamen, That they had not enough. This will unavoidably occasion Differences hereafter, if some extraordinary care be not taken; but I am as far from conceiving what Methods may be effectual, as I should; by a single Opposition, be capable of keeping either Seamen or Soldiers within the limited Bounds, which the Booty it self lay exposed to them.

3. I would now argue like a Soldier, if my unskilfulness in those Affairs did not make it impossible. However I shall adventure to touch on, somewhat that I have heard others say, who have been conversant in ours, as well as the *French* Plantations, as also in our way of attempting the Enemy by Land in that Part of the World.

It hath (as I am informed) been frequently observed, That when our Troops have been put on Shoar, the first thing they have done, has been the raising Batteries against the Enemies Fortifications, and thereby spending time, and very much harrassing the Men, by endeavouring to drive the Enemy out of them. Possibly we did at length gain our Point, and the remaining Part of the naked Walls have been left us for our Pains, while they in the mean time have not wanted Opportunities of conveying their Wealth too far into the Country for our tired Forces to advance in search thereof.

This being done, the time approaches for us to retire; then we demolish as much as possible the remaining part of their Forts, and they repair them again
in

in our Absence; but we leave the Enemy possess of their Riches, and the greatest part of their Plantations untouched. 'Tis that would be the most sensible blow to them, and if instead of troubling our selves at first with their Fortifications, we make it our business to destroy their Settlements, Houses, and the like, it would impoverish them to that degree, and drive them into such despair for Necessaries for Life, that their Forts, and all other things, would of Consequence fall into our Hands at last.

I know upon what Disadvantages I Treat on a Subject so remote from my Knowledge, and there may undoubtedly be many Objections made to what I have said; but if I have set down any thing that may incline more knowing Men to employ their Thoughts on an Affair of such Consequence to the Nation, I shall extreamly rejoyce at my having in some degree been the occasion of it.

4. There are other things of a different Nature, which relate to such Expeditions, and may likewise deserve Consideration; namely,

I. That

I. That when Ships are sent abroad, there be especial Care taken to supply them with all things good and durable in their kind, not only as to Stores but Provisions. I am not saying that there hath been any neglect in the Warrant-Officers of the Yards, from whence they have been heretofore fitted out, and to whose Care it is in a particular manner intrusted; for 'tis impossible for the Gentlemen of the Navy-Board, or Commissioners of the Victualling, personally to inspect thereinto; nor is it indeed in the Power of the Commissioners residing at the Principal Ports, to have such a watchful Eye as to prevent all Slips of this Nature; but this may be observed, That, let the Cause arise from whence it will, experience hath shewn what Opportunities of advantage have slipped through our Fingers, by the badness of the Sails of our Ships of War; but more especially, when Vice-Admiral *Nevil* met with, and gave Chase to a *French* Squadron, as I have before taken notice of.

II. It may therefore be naturally concluded, That if the Ships we send on

Foreign Voyages are not made strong and serviceable as to their Hulls, and supplied with substantial and well-work'd Sails; and if their Rigging is not such as may be durable, they can be but of very little Service; for the Case is very different between them and those employed at home, since the latter may repair into Port for a Supply, and the others must trust to what they have, and patch them up as well as 'tis possible, out of the Stores they carry with them.

III. I have been often told, That the *French* are so very careful of their Sails, but more especially those supplied to their Ships bound on Foreign Service, that they cause them to be pack'd up, and stow'd as carefully as the nicest Merchant would a Quantity of the finest Cloath or Muslins, to prevent their receiving Damage e're they are put to use: 'Twould be well if the like Care was taken on our part; and that those very Materials which are so absolutely necessary, were less exposed, not only to Vermin, but other Accidents, during their lying on Board our Ships unemployed.

There

There needs not many Arguments to explain how necessary it is to provide as well for the Encouragement as for the Preservation of our Seamen, for every one must be sensible how much our Safety depends on them; but a more than ordinary Regard ought to be had to those, who shall from time to time be employ'd in the *West-Indies*. When Squadrons have heretofore been sent thither, there has been no more then a single Physitian allowed; but since the Life of such a Person is altogether as precarious as another Man's, may it not be thought necessary to send two or three? The encrease of Charge is very inconsiderable, and if we employ those who are Able and Industrious; such who will make it their Business, not only to inspect into, but Qualify themselves to judge of the Nature of Diseases incident to those Parts of the World, and consequently of what Remedies are the most proper; the Advantages that may attend the same, by preserving the Lives of Officers as well as Sailers, will be of a thousand times more consequence to our Country, than the saving such a Sum as 500 *l.* a Year. Nay, when the Men are sensible that all possible Care is

taken for their welfare, it is reasonable to believe, that they will with more willingness engage themselves in such Expeditions; whereas they are now so terrified with the thoughts of it, that it does, in no little measure, obstruct the Manning even those Ships that are not immediately designed to those Parts.

Besides this Addition of Physitians, it is humbly proposed, that a proper Ship, or Ships, may be allowed for Hospitals, according to the Strength of the Squadron, on Board of which ought to be able Chyrurgions, good Medicines, and all other things necessary for the Reception and Cure of Sick or Wounded Men. I believe it hath been but too often experienced, That when half a score Men have fallen Sick, either of Fluxes or Fevers, the Disorders they occasion'd by disturbing and breaking the Rest of others, (besides Inconveniences of a much worse nature) hath caused the sudden falling down of many more of the Ship's Company, insomuch, that the Distemper hath spread it self, and that very hastily too, among the whole; whereas had the Sick been timely removed from those who were well, on-
Board

Board Ships proper for their Reception and Cure, the Lives of many Men might undoubtedly have been saved.

In fine, there is not any thing which can more contribute to the Honour and Advantage of these Kingdoms, than the making the Sea-faring People as easy in every particular, as they now are in the punctual Payment of their Wages, by the extraordinary Conduct and Care of my Lord High Treasurer. I do not say, That a thing of this Nature can be effectually compassed in a very short time; but it may be reasonably concluded, That the sooner we bend our Thoughts to it, the better. The getting over one Difficulty, will not only encourage us to encounter others, but give a new Spirit to the Sailors, who have apparently drooped very much, within less than half the time that I have had the Honour to serve in the Navy.

Were they but once made sensible, that all possible Endeavours were using to render their Lives comfortable, they would with greater Zeal betake themselves to the Publick Service; besides it might not only induce them to breed up their Children in their own Calling;

ling; but others, who have not been before at Sea, though arrived to an Age fit for Service, to enter themselves on Board the Fleet.

But since the Subject I am now upon, is remote from what was intended by this small Addition to my Book, namely, *Our Expeditions to the West-Indies*, I shall end both the one and the other, with a sincere and hearty Wish, That Her Majesty's Arms, where-ever they shall be employed, may always meet with Glorious Success, and that we may in time be so fortunate to light on Methods to render the Publick Service rather a Pleasure to our Seamen than otherwise; towards which good Work, if I can any ways contribute, either Singly, or in Conjunction with others, I shall not be sparing either of Time or Pains.



F I N I S.

ERRATA

PAge 38. Line 6. for *Kingdoms* read *Kingdom*, *Ibid.*
l. 26. for *Defcado* r. *Defendo*, p. 52. l. 2. for Cap-
tain *Sont* r. Captain *Soul*, and so in several other Places.

ERRATA

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